Under the pressure of "public opinion" the Government, after repeated deliberations, decided once more on a new enterprise in force, to be directed this time against the German batteries about Chatillon. The collective superior commanders agreed, indeed, that sorties could promise no success without the co-operation of a relieving army from the outside; but, on the 8th, Gambetta had announced the "victory" of the Army of the North at Bapaume, and further had promised that both the Armies of the Loire should advance. Hereupon General Trochu advised that at least the moment should be awaited when the investing army before Paris should be weakened by having to detach anew part of its strength; but he was opposed by the other members of the Government, especially by Monsieur Jules Favre. That gentleman declared that the Maires of Paris were indignant at the bombardment, that the representatives of the city must be allowed some insight into the military situation, and, above all, that negotiations ought long since to have been entered into. Finally, on January 15th, it was determined that the German lines should be broken through at Montretout, Garches, and Buzanval. While confusion and dissensions thus prevailed in Paris, the unity of the German nation, under the Emperor William, was solemnly proclaimed at Versailles. FOOTNOTES: [78] Previously commanding the XIVth Infantry Division. [79] Previously commanding the artillery of the Guard Corps, the well-known military author, best known in England as "Prince Kraft." The slight ambiguity in the text may be removed by the more specific statement that General von Kameke was Chief Director of the Engineer attack, Prince Kraft Chief Director of the Artillery attack on Paris as a whole. On the south front Colonel von Rieff commanded the siege artillery, Major-General Schulz was Engineer-in-chief. On the north and east fronts within the Army of the Meuse Colonels Bartsch and Oppermann had the corresponding commands. Colonel von Ramm is nowhere mentioned in the official distribution of the respective staffs. [80] A casual reader might perhaps infer from these curt sentences, that the French, having possessed themselves by surprise of the weak German post of Clamart, placed in it a garrison of three battalions. The facts were, that the French battalion was scarcely in possession of Clamart when it abandoned village and redoubt; whereupon, to guard against any future attempt on the place on the part of the French, the Germans occupied the village with three battalions and the redoubt with two companies; and further to ensure the security of the position, since it was one of some importance, connected it with Chatillon in the manner described. BATTLE OF MONT VALERIEN. (January 19th.)