The Franco-German War of 1870-71Moltke, Helmuth, Graf von
History
The Franco-German War of 1870-71
Moltke, Helmuth, Graf von
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871
Meanwhile Marshal Bazaine might have realized that he must abandon his
delusion as to a release by means of negotiations; and he now firmly
resolved to cut his way out by dint of force. The troops were served out
with three days' provisions, and the intendance was furnished with a
supply of "iron rations" from the magazines of the fortress. That the
attempt should again be made on the right bank of the Moselle was only
to be expected; since by far the larger portion of the enemy's forces
stood entrenched on the left bank. It would have been very difficult to
traverse that hilly region, intersected by deep ravines; and finally the
army of the Crown Prince on the march to Paris would have had to be
encountered. East of Metz, on the other hand, there afforded ample space
for the full development of the French forces. By bending of the south
the open country was to be reached, offering no effective intercepting
position to the enemy, whose line of investment was weakest in that
direction. The march to the north and along the Belgian frontier
entailed more danger and greater obstacles, yet the Marshal had
explicitly indicated this particular road as that by which he intended
to move. The Army of Chalons was also marching in that direction; its
approach was already reported; and on the 31st of August, on which day,
in fact, Marshal MacMahon's forces reached Stenay[27] in such disastrous
circumstances, Bazaine's army also issued from Metz.
FOOTNOTES:
[26] The Army of Chalons was still unimpaired on August 26th.
[27] "Stenay," probably a slip of the pen for "Sedan," where MacMahon's
army was gathered on August 31st. It never reached Stenay.
BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE.
(August 31st.)
Of the French Corps then located on the right bank of the Moselle,[28]
the IIIrd was to cover on the right flank the advance of the others; one
Division was ordered to move early in a south-easterly direction with
intent to mislead the enemy, its other three Divisions to take position
threatening Noisseville. Three pontoon bridges were constructed for the
crossing of the rest of the army, and accesses to the heights in front
of St. Julien were prepared. The passage of the IVth and VIth Corps was
to begin at six o'clock, and they were to take a position which, linking
on its right with the IIIrd Corps, should extend from the village of Mey
by Grimont to the Moselle; the IInd Corps and the Guard were to follow
and form a second line. With the passage of the artillery reserve and
the cavalry it was expected that the crossing of the Moselle should be
finished by ten o'clock; the trains were halted on the Isle of
Chambiere. Thus it was intended that by noon five Corps should be ready
for the assault of the section of the line of investment from Retonfay
(on the French right) to Argancy (on the left), a distance of about
seven miles, which space had for its defenders only two German
Divisions.
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