The noted zoölogist, _R. Hertwig_, writes: “Inasmuch as there has doubtless been a time when the prevailing temperature of our globe made any life impossible, there must have been a time when life on it arose either by an act of creation or by primordial genesis. If, conformable to the spirit of natural sciences, we are relying only on natural forces for an explanation of natural phenomena, then we are necessarily led to the hypothesis of primordial genesis,” although it contradicts all experience. But the deduction is only brought forth as a “logical postulate”: there “must” be such genesis after creation is eliminated. “We natural scientists say,” states _Plate_, “that all living beings must have originated some time in former geological periods ... from dead, unorganic matter; to assume a creation would be no explanation at all, exactly as it would be no explanation to assume the creation of matter.” Which philosophy teaches that it is not an explanation of a fact to assume for it the only reasonable cause? But just this cause they do not want. _Virchow_ says in this respect: “If I do not wish to assume a creative act, if I desire to explain the matter in my way, then it is clear that I must resort to _generatio aequivoca_. _Tertium non datur._ There is nothing else left, if one once has said: ‘I do not accept creation, but I want an explanation of it.’ If this is the first thesis, the second thesis is, ergo, I accept the _generatio aequivoca_. _But we have no actual proof of it._” Hence _Haeckel_ only follows the lead of others when he writes: “We admit that this process (_primordial genesis_) must remain a pure hypothesis, as long as it is not directly observed or duplicated by experiment. But I repeat that this hypothesis is indispensable for the entire coherence of the history of natural creation. Unless you accept the hypothesis of primordial genesis at this one point in the theory of evolution, you must take refuge in the miracle of a supernatural creation.” Is this science, or is it not rather Theophobia? Does the freedom of science consist, first of all, in the privilege of emancipating one’s self from truth, whenever truth is not to one’s taste? True, liberal science will then be free from distasteful truths, but all the more shackled by its irreligious prejudices.