Although the effective strength of the French Army, when the last man has been armed and placed in the field, is about 4,800,000 men, it must not be supposed that the Republic maintains all these numbers as a fighting force in the field throughout the campaign. About a million and a half of men go out as the "first line," and from those who remain this line is strengthened as and where required. It has become clear since the battle of the Marne that almost a second army was collected under the shelter of the Paris forts to reinforce the retreating line of men who fell back from the Belgian frontier, and in this connection it may be noted that the traditional French method of conducting war is with sixty per cent of the men in the firing line, and the remaining forty per cent in rear as reserves. France's conduct of the war against Germany has shown that this method of fighting--diametrically opposed to the German conception of war--is still being adhered to, and the troops in the firing line by no means compose the whole of the French striking force. As to active service in the French Army, the general English view is that the French soldier, with the exception of the Algerian garrison, sees no service outside European bounds, and the deeds of French soldiers are ignored as regards French colonial possessions and expeditions. In the expedition to Tonquin, to which reference has already been made in connection with the Foreign Legion of the French Army, there were deeds done by individuals and by regiments that are worthy of memory besides the brilliant exploits of our own Army. It is not only to the war in the Crimea and the present campaign that we must look for evidence of the indomitable courage that the French undoubtedly possess, but also to service on the French colonial battlefields, in Chinese swamps and African wilds.