The Committee of Public Safety had abetted the insurrection of the Poles, and had sought, though without result, to stir up war on the Danube as well as on the Vistula, by subsidising the Porte to attack Austria. Carnot, aware of the differences existing between Austria and Prussia, arranged the campaign on the supposition that no vigorous enemy would be found on the Rhine. He designed to confine offensive operations to Belgium, where he hoped to overpower the allies by superiority of numbers, and to threaten Holland and England with invasion. The seat of war may be roughly divided into three divisions: first, the country between the rivers Meuse and Sambre; secondly, the country between the Sambre and the Scheldt; and thirdly, Flanders between the Scheldt and the sea. This long line of territory the allies had to defend with 160,000 against 300,000 men. Their generals had no superior talents enabling them to contend with success against such odds as these. The Duke of York, who had again been appointed to command the English troops, because he was the son of George III., had neither military knowledge nor capacity. Coburg followed without reserve the strategy of the day, which was to put an opposing body of men opposite each body of the enemy, and to defend every locality which had once been occupied. The idea of gaining victory by bringing an overpowering force to bear upon a weak point of the enemy’s line did not suggest itself to him or his staff, and his plan of operations was confined to maintaining his positions and capturing French fortresses.