France -- History -- Revolution, 1789-1799; France -- History -- Revolution, 1789-1799 -- Causes
With these points fixed, and with a readiness to return to them when we
have appreciated the military story, it is well to begin our study by
telling that story briefly, and upon its most general lines. In so
doing, it will be necessary to cover here and there points which have
already been dealt with in this book, but that is inevitable where one
is writing of the military aspect of any movement, for it is impossible
to deal with that aspect save as a living part of the whole: so knit
into national life is the business of war.
ONE
When the Revolution first approached action, the prospect of a war
between France and any other great Power of the time--England, Prussia,
the Empire, or let us say Russia, or even Spain--was such a prospect as
might have been entertained at any time during the past two or three
generations of men.
For pretty well a hundred years men had been accustomed to the
consideration of dynastic quarrels supported by a certain type of army,
which in a moment I shall describe.
I have called these quarrels dynastic; that is, they were mainly
quarrels between the ruling houses of Europe: were mainly motived by
the desire of each ruling house to acquire greater territory and
revenue, and were limited by the determination of all the ruling houses
to maintain certain ideas inviolate, as, for instance, the sacredness of
monarchy, the independence of individual States, etc. Though they were
in the main dynastic, yet in proportion as a dynasty might represent a
united nation, they were national also. The English oligarchy was in
this respect peculiar and more national than any European Government of
its time. It is also true to say that the Russian despotism had behind
it, in most of its military adventures and in all its spirit of
expansion, the subconscious agreement of the people.
Still, however national, the wars of the time preceding the Revolution
moved within a fixed framework of ideas, as it were, which no commander
and no diplomatist dreamed of exceeding. A, the crowned head of a State,
would have some claims against B, the crowned head of another State,
with regard to certain territories. C, the crowned head or Government of
a third State, would remain neutral or ally himself with either of the
two; if he allied himself, then, as a rule, it was with the weaker
against the stronger, in order to guarantee himself against too great an
increase on the part of a rival. Or, again, a rebellion would break out
against the power of A in some part of his dominions; then would B,
somewhat reluctantly (as the almost unlimited right of an existing
executive was still a strong dogma in men’s minds), tend to ally
himself with the rebels in order to diminish the power of A.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account