France -- History -- Revolution, 1789-1799; France -- History -- Revolution, 1789-1799 -- Causes
The consequence of this strange passage upon the political history of
the time we have already seen. Its consequence upon the military history
of it was indirect but profound. The French forces, such as they were,
were still intact, but no general officer could in future be trusted by
Paris, and the stimulus which nations in the critical moments of
invasion and of danger during foreign war seek in patriotism, in the
offering of a high wage to the men and of honours and fortunes to their
commanders, was now sought by the French in the singular, novel and
abnormal experiment of the Terror. Command upon the frontier throughout
1793 and the first part of 1794, during the critical fourteen months,
that is, which decided the fate of the Revolution, and which turned the
tide of arms in favour of the French, was a task accomplished under the
motive power of capital punishment. A blunder was taken as a proof of
treason, and there lay over the ordering of every general movement the
threat of the guillotine.
What we have now to follow is somewhat over a year of a struggle thus
abnormally organised upon the French side, and finally successful
through the genius of a great organiser, once a soldier, now a
politician, Carnot. The French succeeded by the unshakable conviction
which permitted the political leaders to proceed to all extremity in
their determination to save the Revolution; by the peculiar physical
powers of endurance which their army displayed, and finally, of course,
by certain accidents--for accident will always be a determining factor
in war.
The spring of 1793, the months of April and May, form the first crisis
of the revolutionary war. The attack about to be delivered is universal,
and seems absolutely certain to succeed. With the exception of the rush
at Jemappes, where less than thirty thousand Austrians were broken
through by a torrent superior in numbers (though even there obviously
ill-organised), no success had attended the revolutionary armies. Their
condition was, even to the eye of the layman, bad, and to the eye of the
expert hopeless. There was no unity apparent in direction, there were
vast lesions in the discipline of the ranks like great holes torn in
some rotten fabric. Even against the forces already mobilised against
it, it had proved powerless, and it might be taken for granted that by
an act more nearly resembling police work than a true campaign, the
Allies would reach Paris and something resembling the old order be soon
restored. What remains is to follow the process by which this
expectation was disappointed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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