Our power over Germany becomes every day less: First, by the break-up of the Alliance. The 'sacred egoisms' which produced the War are now disrupting the Allies. The most potentially powerful European member of the Alliance or Association--Russia--has become an enemy; the most powerful member of all, America, has withdrawn from co-operation; Italy is in conflict with one Ally, Japan with another. Secondly, by the more extended Balkanisation of Europe. The States utilised by (for instance) France as the instruments of Allied policy (Poland, Hungary, Ukrainia, Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia) are liable to quarrel among themselves. The groups rendered hostile to Allied policy--Germany, Russia, China--are much larger, and might well once more become cohesive units. The Nationalism which is a factor of Allied disintegration may nevertheless work for the consolidation of the groups opposed to us. Thirdly, by the economic disorganisation of Europe (resulting mainly from the desire to weaken the enemy), which deprives the Alliance of economic resources sufficient for a military task like that of the conquest of Russia or the occupation of Germany. Fourthly, by the social unrest within each country (itself due in part to the economic disorganisation, in part to the introduction of the psychology of jingoism into the domain of industrial strife): Bolshevism. A long war of intervention in Russia by the Alliance would have broken down under the strain of internal unrest in Allied countries. The Alliance thus succumbs to the clash of Nationalisms and the clash of classes. These moral factors render the purpose which will be given to accumulated military force--'the direction in which the guns will shoot'--so uncertain that the amount of material power available is no indication of the degree of security attained. If it were true, as we argued so universally before and during the War, that German power was the final cause of the armament rivalry in Europe, then the disappearance of that power should mark, as so many prophesied it would mark, the end of the 'armament era.'[47] Has it done so? Or does any one to-day seriously argue that the increase of armament expenditure over the pre-war period is in some mystic way due to Prussian militarism? Let us turn to a _Times_ leader in the summer of 1920:-- 'To-day the condition of Europe and of a large portion of the world is scarcely less critical than it was six years ago. Within a few days, or at most a few weeks, we may know whether the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles will possess effective validity. The independent existence of Poland, which is a keystone of the reorganisation of Europe contemplated by the Treaty, is in grave peril; and with it, though perhaps not in the manner currently imagined in Germany, is jeopardised the present situation of Germany herself.