Our political, quite as much as our social, conduct is in the main the result of motives that are mainly unconscious instinct, habit, unquestioned tradition. So long as we find the result satisfactory, well and good. But when the result of following instinct is disaster, we realise that the time has come to 'get outside ourselves,' to test our instincts by their social result. We have then to see whether the 'reasons' we have given for our conduct are really its motives. That examination is the first step to rendering the unconscious motive conscious. In considering, for instance, the two methods indicated in this chapter, we say, in 'rationalising' our decision, that we chose the lesser of two risks. I am suggesting that in the choice of the method of the Balance of Power our real motive was not desire to achieve security, but domination. It is just because our motives are not mainly intellectual but 'instinctive' that the desire for domination is so likely to have played the determining role: for few instincts and innate desires are stronger than that which pushes to 'self-affirmation'--the assertion of preponderant force. We have indeed seen that the Balance of Power means in practice the determination to secure a preponderance of power. What is a 'Balance?' The two sides will not agree on that, and each to be sure will want it tilted in its favour. We decline to place ourselves within the power of another who may differ from us as to our right. We demand to be stronger, in order that we may be judge in our own case. This means that we shall resist the claim of others to exactly the same thing. The alternative is partnership. It means trust. But we have seen that the exercise of any form of force, other than that which one single individual can wield, must involve an element of 'trust.' The soldiers must be trusted to obey the officers, since the former have by far the preponderance of force; the officers must be trusted to obey the constitution instead of challenging it; the police must be trusted to obey the authorities; the Cabinet must be trusted to obey the electoral decision; the members of an alliance to work together instead of against one another, and so on. Yet the assumption of the 'Power Politician' is that the method which has succeeded (notably within the State) is the 'idealistic' but essentially unpractical method in which security and advantage are sacrificed to Utopian experiment; while the method of competitive armament, however distressing it may be to the Sunday Schools, is the one that gives us real security. 'The way to be sure of preserving peace,' says Mr Churchill, 'is to be so much stronger than your enemy that he won't dare to attack you.' In other words it is obvious that the way for two people to keep the peace is for each to be stronger than the other.