The Fruits of Victory: A Sequel to The Great IllusionAngell, Norman
History
The Fruits of Victory: A Sequel to The Great Illusion
Angell, Norman
Economic history -- 1918-1945; World War, 1914-1918 -- Influence
'Well, we have seen that all such treaties are worth less than
scraps of paper when it becomes to the interests of powerful and
ruthless militarist nations to disregard them.... After this War is
over, these foolish pacifist creatures will again raise their
piping voices against preparedness and in favour of patent devices
for maintaining peace without effort. Let us enter into every
reasonable agreement which bids fair to minimise the chances of war
and to circumscribe its area.... But let us remember it is a
hundred times more important for us to prepare our strength for our
own defence than to enter any of these peace treaties, and that if
we thus prepare our strength for our own defence we shall minimise
the chances of war as no paper treaties can possibly minimise them;
and we shall thus make our views effective for peace and justice in
the world at large as in no other way can they be made
effective.'[69]
Let us dispose of one or two of the more devastating confusions in the
foregoing.
First there is the everlasting muddle as to the internationalist
attitude towards the likelihood of war. To Colonel Roosevelt one is an
internationalist or 'pacifist' because one thinks war will not take
place. Whereas probably the strongest motive of internationalism is the
conviction that without it war is inevitable, that in a world of rival
nationalisms war cannot be avoided. If those who hate war believe that
the present order will without effort give them peace, why in the name
of all the abuse which their advocacy brings on their heads should they
bother further about the matter?
Secondly, internationalism is assumed to be the _alternative_ to the
employment of force or power of arms, whereas it is the organisation of
force, of power (latent or positive) to a common--an international--end.
Our incurable habit of giving to homely but perfectly healthy and
justifiable reasons of conduct a high faluting romanticism sometimes
does morality a very ill service. When in political situations--as in
the making of a Peace Treaty--a nation is confronted by the general
alternative we are now discussing, the grounds of opposition to a
co-operative or 'Liberal' or 'generous' settlement are almost always
these: 'Generosity' is lost upon a people as crafty and treacherous as
the enemy; he mistakes generosity for weakness; he will take advantage
of it; his nature won't be softened by mild treatment; he understands
nothing but force.
The assumption is that the liberal policy is based upon an appeal to the
better side of the enemy; upon arousing his nobler nature. And such an
assumption concerning the Hun or the Bolshevik, for instance (or at an
earlier date, the Boer or the Frenchman), causes the very gorge of the
Roosevelt-Bottomley patriot to rise in protest. He simply does not
believe in the effective operation of so remote a motive.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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