The Fruits of Victory: A Sequel to The Great IllusionAngell, Norman
History
The Fruits of Victory: A Sequel to The Great Illusion
Angell, Norman
Economic history -- 1918-1945; World War, 1914-1918 -- Influence
It was not merely an act of the statesmen. The worst features of the
Treaty were imposed by popular feeling--put into the Treaty by statesmen
who did not believe in them, and only included them in order to satisfy
public opinion. The policy of President Wilson failed in part because of
the humane and internationalist opinion of the America of 1916 had
become the fiercely chauvinist and coercive opinion of 1919, repudiating
the President's efforts.
Part of the story of these transformations has been told in the
preceding pages. Let us summarise the story as a whole.
We saw at the beginning of the War a real feeling for the right of
peoples to choose their own form of government, for the principle of
nationality. At the end of the War we deny that right in half a score of
cases,[72] where it suits our momentary political or military interest.
The very justification of 'necessity,' which shocks our conscience when
put forward by the enemy, is the one we invoke callously at the
peace--or before it, as when we agree to allow Czarist Russia to do what
she will with Poland, and Italy with Serbia. Having sacrificed the small
State to Russia in 1916, we are prepared to sacrifice Russia to the
small State in 1919, by encouraging the formation of border
independencies, which, if complete independencies, must throttle Russia,
and which no 'White' Russian would accept. While encouraging the lesser
States to make war on Russia, we subsidise White Russian military
leaders who will certainly destroy the small States if successful. We
entered the War for the destruction of militarism, and to make
disarmament possible, declaring that German arms were the cause of our
arms; and having destroyed German arms, we make ours greater than they
were before the War, and introduce such new elements as the systematic
arming of African savages for European warfare. We fought to make the
secret bringing about of war by military or diplomatic cliques
impossible, and after the Armistice the decision to wage war on the
Russian Republic is made without even public knowledge, in opposition to
sections in the Cabinets concerned, by cliques of whose composition the
public is completely ignorant.[73] The invasion of Russia from the
north, south, east, and west, by European, Asiatic, and negro troops, is
made without a declaration of war, after a solemn statement by the chief
spokesman of the Allies that there should be no invasion. Having
declared, during the War, on a score of occasions, that we were not
fighting against any right or interest of the German people[74]--or the
German people at all--because we realised that only by ensuring that
right and interest ourselves could we turn Germany from the ways of the
past, at the peace we impose conditions which make it impossible for the
German people even adequately to feed their population, and leave them
no recourse but the recreation of their power. Having promised at the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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