Great Britain would be first and most immediately menaced by this; for a
strong military and naval power established on the Bosporus would hold
in command the shortest way of communication with her possessions in
India. The Czar would hold in control the route by way of the Suez
canal: or at best Great Britain could keep it open only by maintaining a
vastly superior fleet in the Mediterranean; and it would be difficult
for her to maintain there a fleet which would not be practically
overmatched by one which Russia could easily keep up in the Black Sea
and the Sea of Marmora. The days are past when a Hood or a Nelson might
safely risk a battle if the odds against him were much less than two to
one. A British admiral must henceforth make his count upon meeting skill
and seamanship equal to his own, and whatever advantage he gains must be
gained by sheer preponderance of force.
If Great Britain is to retain her Indian empire, a collision there
between her and Russia is a foregone conclusion. An empire which, under
a succession of sovereigns of very different character, has steadily
pressed its march of conquest through the deserts of Turkistan, will not
be likely to look without longing eyes upon the fertile valley of the
Indus; and here Russia would have a fearful advantage in position. The
Suez route practically closed, as it would be in the event of a war,
Britain could only reach India by the long voyage around the Cape of
Good Hope, while Russia would have broad highways for the march of her
troops to the banks of the Indus, whence she could menace the whole
peninsula of Hindostan.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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