During this peace Austria had recruited her strength, and with it her inveterate hostility to Prussia; and it became known to Frederic that a secret agreement for the conquest and partition of his territories existed between Austria, Russia, and Saxony. The circumstances of the times were such that, though neither France nor England were cordially disposed towards him, it was yet open to him to negotiate an alliance with either. Frederic chose that of England; and France, forgetting ancient enmities, and her obvious political interest, immediately took part with Austria. The odds of force apparently were overwhelming; but, having made up his mind, the King of Prussia displayed his usual promptitude. He demanded an explanation of the views of the court of Vienna, and, on receiving an unsatisfactory answer, signified that he considered it a declaration of war. Knowing that the court of Saxony, contrary to existing treaties, was secretly engaged in the league against him, he marched an army into the electorate in August, 1756, and, almost unopposed, took military possession of it. He thus turned the enemy’s resources against himself, and drew from that unfortunate country continual supplies of men and money, without which he could scarcely have supported the protracted struggle which ensued, and which is celebrated under the title of the Seven Years’ War. The events of this war, however interesting to a military student, are singularly unfit for concise narration, and that from the very circumstances which displayed the King of Prussia’s talents to most advantage. Attacked on every side, compelled to hasten from the pursuit of a beaten, to make head in some other quarter against a threatening enemy, the activity, vigilance, and indomitable resolution of Frederic must strike all those who read these campaigns at length, and with the necessary help of maps and plans, though his profound tactical skill and readiness in emergencies may be fully appreciable only by the learned. But when these complicated events are reduced to a bare list of marches and countermarches, victories and defeats, the spirit vanishes, and a mere _caput mortuum_ remains. The war being necessarily defensive, Frederic could seldom carry the seat of action into an enemy’s country. The Prussian dominions were subject to continual ravage, and that country, as well as Saxony, paid a heavy price that the possession of Silesia might be decided between two rival sovereigns. Upon the whole, the first campaigns were favourable to Prussia; but the confessed superiority of that power in respect of generals (for the King was admirably supported by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, Prince Henry of Prussia, Schwerin, Keith, and others) could not always countervail the great superiority of force with which it had to contend. The celebrated victory won by the Prussians at Prague, May 6, 1757, was balanced by a severe defeat at Kolin, the result, as Frederic confesses, of his own rashness; but, at