The unprecedentedly-long period during which Lord Mansfield presided in the King’s Bench is one of considerable importance in the history of British jurisprudence; indeed, the multiplicity of his decisions during a period of thirty-four years could not fail materially to affect the law relating both to commercial and other property, especially in a country so rapidly increasing in wealth, and in which new cases were continually arising out of the ever-changing state of society. By a large body of his admirers, a class including the majority of the nation, he was regarded with almost unlimited admiration; but several of his important judgments have since been overruled; and we probably shall not err in stating it as the general opinion of well-informed persons in the present day, that, indecent and virulent as is Junius’s attack on him as a judge, there is a solid foundation for the charge that he was more prone to enlarge the power of the crown than to protect the liberty of the subject, and more willingly referred to the Roman law and the law of nations than to Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights. But the charge of introducing equitable doctrines into the common law must be received with much more caution. He may have gone too far in his favourite scheme of introducing more enlarged and liberal views than had prevailed before his time; he may have neglected former authorities, and introduced too great laxity in the interpretation of the law; but, dangerous as such licence is, lest, in the uncertainty of law, a greater evil be incurred than by the occasional commission of an essential injustice, yet we must look with complacency on that alleged tendency to relax the strict rigour of law in favour of substantial justice, which seems to have consisted chiefly in a disposition to admit evidence when mere technical disqualification, and not essential unfitness, was urged against it; and rather to let right prevail than give the victory to wrong by rigid adherence to the technicalities of the law. His feelings may be illustrated by a playful saying of his own to Garrick. “A judge on the bench is now and then in your whimsical situation between Tragedy and Comedy; inclination drawing one way, and a long string of precedents the other.” It is certain that to him we owe all that our mercantile law has of system, and of consistency with the principles which govern the practice of other nations. It is no less true that the remedies generally afforded by our courts of law have become much more beneficial, since he enlarged and moulded actions originally of an equitable nature to suit cases to which proceedings in equity are very ill adapted. Nor is it too much to assert that under him the science of law assumed the form of a liberal study.