endeavoured to obtain from the States General, in the treaty of 1654, the perpetual exclusion of the Prince of Orange from the Stadtholdership: but not being able to obtain their consent to this, contented himself with the assent of the States of Holland, as far as regarded their own province, which was accorded by a secret article. After the Restoration it was to be expected that Charles II. would support the interests of his nephew the Prince of Orange; and De Witt thenceforward cultivated the alliance of France in preference to that of England. This, and the jealousy of the English nation at the commercial prosperity of the Dutch, led to the breaking out of a bloody war in 1665, in which the preponderance of success was on the side of England. The spirit, energy, and ability of De Witt was the main stay of his countrymen under the reverses which they sustained in this contest: their disasters were promptly repaired, their defeated armaments refitted, their credit sustained; and Charles II. becoming weary of a war which brought no advantages to compensate for the drain which it occasioned on the treasury, condescended to open negotiations for peace in 1667. These, however, proceeded but slowly: and while they were yet pending, De Witt planned that memorable expedition which surprised our ill-guarded shores, burnt our ships in the Thames, and threw the metropolis into the utmost alarm. The course of diplomacy being quickened by this event, the treaty of Breda was soon after concluded, on terms not disadvantageous to Holland.