Only the more salient passages of this Memorandum need be recalled to illustrate how far the performances of the German Fleet have fallen short of the high hopes which were entertained for it. In the opening passages of the Memorandum, it was explained why "the German Empire needs peace at sea": For the German Empire of to-day the security of its economic development, and especially of its world-trade, is a life question. For this purpose the German Empire needs not only peace on land but also peace at sea--not, however, peace at any price, but peace with honour, which satisfies its just requirements. A naval war for economic interests, particularly for commercial interests, will probably be of long duration, for the aim of a superior opponent will be all the more completely reached the longer the war lasts. To this must be added that a naval war which, after the destruction or shutting-up of the German sea fighting force, was confined to the blockade of the coasts and the capture of merchant ships, would cost the opponent little; indeed he would, on the contrary, amply cover the expenses of the war by the simultaneous improvement of his own trade. An unsuccessful naval war of the duration of even only a year would destroy Germany's sea trade, and would thereby bring about the most disastrous conditions, first in her economic, and then, as an immediate consequence of that, in her social life. Quite apart from the consequences of the possible peace conditions, the destruction of our sea trade during the war could not, even at the close of it, be made good within measurable time, and would thus add to the sacrifices of the war a serious economic depression. The Memorandum then proceeded to justify the abandonment of the Navy Law passed as recently as 1898: The Navy Law (of 1898) does not make allowance for the possibility of a naval war with a great naval Power, because, when it was drafted in the summer of 1897, the first consideration was to secure the carrying out in modern ship material of the 1873 plan for the founding of the fleet, limiting the increase to the small number of battleships which was necessary to establish, at least for a double squadron, the organization demanded by tactical exigencies. The Justificatory Memorandum to the Navy Law (of 1898) left no doubt as to the military significance of the Battle Fleet. It is therein expressly stated: "Against greater sea-powers the Battle Fleet would have importance merely as a sortie fleet."