For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Battle Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet. In order to attain the goal which has been set, the protection of our sea trade and of our colonies by ensuring a peace with honour, Germany requires, according to the standard of the strength-relationships of the great Sea-Powers, and having regard to our tactical formations, two double squadrons of efficient battleships, with the necessary cruisers, torpedo-boats, and so on, pertaining thereto. As the Navy Law (of 1898) provides for only two squadrons, the building of a third and fourth squadron is contemplated. Of these four squadrons two will form a fleet. The second fleet is to be organized in its tactical composition in the same way as the first fleet provided for in the Navy Law. For the scope of the maintenance in commission in time of peace the following consideration has been decisive: As the ship-establishment of the German Navy, even after the carrying out of the projected increase, will still be more or less inferior to the ship-establishments of some other great Powers, compensation must be sought in the training of the personnel and in tactical training in the larger combinations. A trustworthy training of the separate ships' crews, as well as an adequate training in the larger tactical combinations, can be ensured only by permanent maintenance in commission in time of peace. To economize in commissioning in time of peace would mean to jeopardize the efficiency of the fleet for the event of war. The minimum of commissioning is the permanent formation of that fleet which comprises the newest and best ships as an active combination--that is to say, a combination in which all battleships and cruisers are in commission. This fleet would form the school for tactical training in double squadron, and in case of war would bear the first shock. For the second fleet, which will comprise the older battleships, it must suffice if only half of the ships are permanently in commission.[19] For training in the larger combination some further ships must then, it is true, be placed temporarily in commission during the manoeuvres. In case of war this second fleet--the Reserve Battle Fleet--will have to make up its arrears in the training of the separate ships' crews and the deficiency of training in the larger combination behind the protection afforded by the Active Battle Fleet. If Germany possesses four squadrons of efficient battleships, a coast squadron composed of small armoured ships is less important.