The Ghost-dance religion and the Sioux outbreak of 1890 : $b Fourteenth annual report of the Bureau of Ethnology, part 2.Mooney, James
Religion
The Ghost-dance religion and the Sioux outbreak of 1890 : $b Fourteenth annual report of the Bureau of Ethnology, part 2.
Mooney, James
Dakota Indians -- Wars, 1890-1891; Ghost dance
and suggested that it would be necessary to call out the military. (_G.
D., 26._)
About the same time Agent Palmer at Cheyenne River reported to the
Department that Big Foot’s band (afterward engaged at Wounded Knee)
was very much excited over the coming of the messiah, and could not be
kept by the police from dancing. In reply, both agents were instructed
to use every prudent measure to stop the dance and were told that
military assistance would be furnished if immediate need should arise.
(_L. B., 1._) Instructions were also sent to agents in Nevada to warn
the leaders of the dance in that quarter to desist. A few days later
the agent at Cheyenne River had a talk with the dancers, and so far
convinced them of the falsity of their hopes that he was able to report
that the excitement was dying out, but recommended the removal of Hump,
as a leader of the disaffection. (_G. D., 27._)
By the advice of the Department, Royer had consulted General Miles,
at that time passing on his way to the west, as to the necessity for
troops, and, after hearing a full statement, the general expressed
the opinion that the excitement would die out of itself. The next day
the general had a talk with the Indians, who informed him that they
intended to continue the dance. He gave them some good advice and
told them that they must stop. Had the matter rested here until the
words of the commanding officer could have been deliberated in their
minds—for the mental process of an Indian can not well be hurried—all
might have been well. Unfortunately, however, the agent, now thoroughly
frightened, wrote a long letter to the Department on October 30,
stating that the only remedy for the matter was the use of military,
and that about 600 or 700 troops would be necessary. On November 11 he
telegraphed for permission to come to Washington to “explain,” and was
refused. Then came other telegraphic requests, at the rate of one every
day, for the same permission, all of which were refused, with pointed
intimation that the interests of the service required that the agent
should remain at his post of duty. Finally the matter was reported by
the Indian Office to the War Department, and on November 15 Royer was
instructed to report the condition of affairs to the commander of the
nearest military post, Port Robinson, Nebraska. On the same day he had
telegraphed that the Indians were wild and crazy and that at least a
thousand soldiers were needed. The agent at Rosebud also now reported
that his Indians were beyond control by the police. Special agents were
sent to both agencies and confirmed the reports as to the alarming
condition of affairs. The agent at Crow Creek and Lower Brulé agency
reported at the same time that his Indians were under good control and
that the police were sufficient for all purposes. (_G. D., 28; L. B.,
2._)
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