§6. One of the means by which satisfaction is sought without making war, is that of _reprisals_. (Chap. XXXVI, §4, 5.) If a nation has taken what belongs to another, or refuses to pay a debt, or to make satisfaction for an injury, the offended nation seizes something belonging to the former or to her citizens, and retains it, or applies it to her own advantage, till she obtains satisfaction: and when there shall be no longer any hope of satisfaction, the effects thus seized are confiscated. To _confiscate_ is to adjudge property to be forfeited, and to appropriate it to the use and benefit of the state. But as the loss in this case would fall upon unoffending citizens, it is the duty of their government to grant them indemnity. §7. But to justify reprisals by the law of nations, the grounds upon which they are authorized must be just and well ascertained. If the right of the party demanding satisfaction is doubtful, he must first demand an equitable examination of his claim, and next be able to show that justice has been refused, before he can justly take the matter into his own hands. He has no right to disturb the peace and safety of nations on a doubtful pretension. But if the other party refuses to have the matter brought to the proof, or to accede to any proposition to terminate the dispute in a peaceable manner, reprisals become lawful. §8. By treaties of alliance, nations sometimes agree to assist each other in case of war with a third power. It is a question not clearly settled, whether the government that is to afford the aid is bound to do so when it deems the war to be unjust. The reasonable conclusion seems to be, that, in cases simply doubtful, the justice of the war is to be presumed; and the government pledging its aid is bound to fulfill its engagement. The contrary doctrine would furnish a nation with too ready a pretext for violating its pledge. In cases only of the clearest injustice on the part of its ally, can a nation rightfully avoid a positive engagement to afford assistance. §9. But when the object of the war is hopeless, or when the state under such engagement would, by furnishing the assistance, endanger its own safety, it is not bound to render the aid. But the danger must not be slight, remote, or uncertain. None but extreme cases would afford sufficient cause for withholding the promised assistance. §10. When the alliance is defensive, the treaty binds each party to assist the other only when engaged in a defensive war, and unjustly attacked. By the conventional law of nations, the government that first declares, or actually begins the war, is considered as making _offensive_ war; and though it should not be the first actually to apply force, yet if it first renders the application of force necessary, it is the aggressor; and the other party, though the first to apply force, is engaged in a _defensive_ war. (§1.) Chapter LXVI.