In the absence of an elaborate slave system in India, there was not the steady public machinery of conversion which operated powerfully in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, it would seem that before the reign of Aurangzeb no emperor cared to promote conversion to Islam by financial or political rewards. Akbar, in fact, removed the jizyeh, or poll-tax, which had previously, as in all other truly Moslem lands until recent times, laid special burdens upon unbelievers, and the tax was not reimposed until the time of Aurangzeb. Akbar also forbade the enslavement of captives and of their wives and children. For a century, therefore, the government lent little encouragement to change of faith. Down to the accession of Aurangzeb there was a clear contrast between Ottoman and Mogul policy in the attitude toward the Moslem religion: the Moguls held far less than the Ottomans to the idea of the conquest of the world for Islam, or to the conversion of unbelievers, as an object of governmental endeavor. Aurangzeb alone had such zeal as characterizes the average descendant of Osman; he desired no infidels in his service, and regarded the Deccan as the _Dar-ul-harb_ which he wished to make part of the _Dar-ul-Islam_. There can be no doubt, however, that under all the Mogul emperors the social pressure usual in Moslem lands continued to encourage conversion privately, while the slavery which Islam normally sanctions was also contributing to the increase of the faithful. Moreover, it is not likely that all the officers of the liberal emperors were as tolerant and as indifferent to Moslem progress as were their superiors. THE ARMY At Delhi, as at Constantinople, no sharp line could be drawn separating government and army. The Mogul conquest was achieved by an army, and the army became a government. Amalgamation with older systems of course introduced groups of under-officials who had no military duties; but those who would be great had to be capable of military command, men who might be familiar with the pen but who must know how to wield the sword. The Mogul army organization seems, in the midst of confused testimonies, to have borne a considerable resemblance to that of the Ottomans. The emperor was commander-in-chief, and as late as Aurangzeb regularly commanded in person in great campaigns. He had a personal army of 12,000 to 15,000 paid infantry and 12,000 to 40,000 paid cavalry. These corresponded in number and function, but not at all in political importance, to the Janissaries and _Spahis_ of the Porte among the Ottomans. In great campaigns the standing army was supported by the feudal cavalry, estimated at from 200,000 to 400,000, and by indefinite numbers of irregular infantry, drawn from a mass estimated at four millions. The army was strong in artillery, and possessed in trained elephants a force of which the Ottomans could not make use.