The government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the MagnificentLybyer, Albert Howe
History
The government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent
Lybyer, Albert Howe
Süleyman I, Sultan of the Turks, 1494 or 1495-1566; Turkey -- Politics and government
The scope of the present treatise confines the discussion of the
Ruling Institution as an army to those features which lie nearest the
governmental aspect. The great majority of its members constituted the
standing army of the empire, in the two great sections of Janissaries,
or infantry, and _Spahis_ of the Porte, or cavalry. Subordinate sections
cared for the artillery and transport services, and for other necessary
adjuncts to campaigning. Although the feudal _Spahis_ did not receive pay
from the sultan, and hence were not properly _kullar_, their officers
were his slaves, even though many of them were supported during their
term of service from fiefs. Besides these regular troops there were
also attached to the Ottoman army certain irregular bodies of a lower
order,—the _Akinji_, the _Azabs_, the Kurds, and so on.
THE JANISSARIES[287]
The body of regular infantry known as _Yenicheri_, or “new troops,” a
name which the West has changed to Janissaries, comes near to standing
in the Western imagination for the sultan’s entire slave-family.[288]
In the sixteenth century, however, it formed not more than a fourth of
the whole number; nor does its importance seem to have been beyond its
numerical proportion, except in one or two respects. Since its members
were physically trained beyond comparison with their intellectual
education, since they were kept in poverty and hence were comparatively
irresponsible, and since a large portion of them were in comparative
idleness in time of peace, they were liable to act as an organized and
very dangerous mob. They might start a riot on short notice, or burn a
section of the city in order to pillage the neighboring houses, or rifle
the shops of the Jews, or plunder the grand vizier’s establishment.[289]
They could not easily be restrained from plundering cities which had
capitulated or from violating terms of surrender.[290] They felt that
the death of a sultan gave them an interregnum of license before the
accession of a new sovereign.[291] They demanded donatives at the
succession of a new ruler with such increasing rapacity as to embarrass
the treasury;[292] and they needed to be braced at critical moments
by liberal presents.[293] In time of battle, however, they drew up an
invincible line behind which the person of their sovereign was as safe as
in an impregnable fortress. Their devotion to his person was the greater
because they were in a special sense his _kullar_, and because he was one
of them, being inscribed in one of their _odas_ and receiving his pay
regularly.[294] In small groups on garrison duty their severe training
seems to have made of them an efficient police.[295] Yet their _esprit de
corps_, resting on consciousness of power, made them feared at all times.
They took an active part in determining the destinies of the empire in
two ways,—by limiting conquests, and by influencing the succession to
the throne.[296] They compelled the mighty Selim to turn back from both
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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