The conditions for leaving the other two fleet bases, Cromarty and Rosyth, were, of course, simpler, owing to the absence of the very strong cross-tides, but fog was even more prevalent at Rosyth than at Scapa, and the operation of leaving with a considerable number of ships was not at all an easy one. It was skilfully performed under difficulties on very numerous occasions and with remarkable freedom from accident during my period of command. The approach to the Firth of Forth in thick weather was difficult, and many anxious moments were experienced in making the land when the position of the ships had not been accurately ascertained by sights for some time before approaching the base. These approaches could have been mined by the enemy with great ease by surface ships had they been sufficiently enterprising, and it was a standing wonder to me that the attempt was never made. CHAPTER XI THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916 It may not be out of place here to touch upon the general naval situation in the spring of 1916--that is, on the eve of the Battle of Jutland. What were the strategical conditions? To what extent was it justifiable to take risks with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks the full consequences of which could not be foreseen owing to the new conditions of naval warfare? The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our available capital ships. There was very little in the way of reserve behind it. The battleships _not_ included in the Grand Fleet were all of them pre-Dreadnoughts and therefore inferior fighting units. They consisted of seven ships of the “King Edward VII.” class, two ships of the “Lord Nelson” class, and four of the “Queen” class, all of these ships being in the Mediterranean except five of the “King Edward VII.” class. They were required there either for work with the Italian Fleet or for the operations in the Ægean. Five of our light cruisers were also in the Mediterranean. The French and Italian Battle Fleets were also in the Mediterranean, but, owing to political considerations and their duty in watching the Austrian Fleet, there was little prospect of their leaving that locality. It is interesting to compare this situation with that existing a century earlier. In September, 1805, the month before Trafalgar, the disposition of British ships in commission in home waters and the Mediterranean is given in the following table: