“At 8.30 P.M. the visibility of grey ships was about 9,000 yards.” “At 8.45 P.M. _King George V._ again sighted, bearing north-north-east. Visibility had again improved, and her range was estimated at about 10,000 yards. Conformed to her course S. 75 W. to close enemy.” At 7.20 P.M. the ships engaged by our battle cruisers turned away and were lost to sight. They were located for a moment at 8.20 P.M. with the aid of the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, and, although they disappeared again at once, they were once more located and effectively engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 P.M. at about 10,000 yards range. They turned away once more and were finally lost to sight by the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (the last ships to keep in touch) at 8.38 P.M., steaming to the westward. This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers had of putting the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon’s work. They had, under the very able and gallant leadership of Sir David Beatty, assisted by the splendid squadron so well commanded by Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone far to crush out of existence the opposing Battle Cruiser Squadron. It will be seen from the above account that our battle cruisers experienced great difficulty in locating and holding the enemy after 7.20 P.M., even when far ahead of the Battle Fleet, with its small craft, and therefore in a position of freedom from the smoke of our own vessels and the enemy’s line. After this time, 7.20 P.M., the battle cruisers were only engaged for some six minutes. The enemy turned away on each occasion when he was located and showed no disposition to fight. The visibility by this time had become very bad; the light was failing, and it became necessary to decide on the disposition for the night. CHAPTER XIV THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND--(_Continued_) III.--THE NIGHT ACTION The situation, which had never been at all clear to me owing to the fact that I had not seen more than a few ships at a time, appeared to be as follows: We were between the enemy and his bases, whether he shaped a course to return via the Horn Reef, via Heligoland direct, or via the swept channel which he was known to use along the coast of the West Frisian Islands. I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward of us. He had been turning on _interior_ lines throughout. We had altered course gradually during the action from south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points, or 146 degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it was possible that ships, which had fallen out owing to damage, might be to the northward. The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to my mind, but for several reasons it was not my intention to seek such an action between the heavy ships. It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments against it.