[135] This it the only reason why Nietzsche extols art, and declares (along with all modern moralism) the supremacy of the artist over the philosopher, because art seems to him to possess the value of action. Apart from this point of view, it seems just to say with one of his critics: ‘At bottom Nietzsche despised art and artists.... In art he condemns a feminine principle, the mimicry of the actor, the love of dress and all that glitters.... Remember the eloquent page where he praises Shakespeare, the greatest of poets, for having abased the figure of the poet, whom he treats as a stage-player, before Caesar, _that divine man_.’ (C. Schuwer, _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_, April, 1926.) For Sorel art is great because it is an anticipation of intense production, as it tends to manifest itself more and more in our society. [136] _Evolution Créatrice_, page 216. The true formula of Bergsonism should be, ‘I grow, therefore I am.’ Notice also the tendency of modern philosophy to make the practical character of thought its essential characteristic and to make its consciousness of itself a secondary characteristic: ‘Perhaps thought must be defined as the faculty of combining means towards certain ends rather than by the sole property of being clear to itself.’ (D. Roustan, _Leçons de Psychologie_, page 73.) [137] The Sphex. The example is given in _L’Evolution Créatrice_, and has had an immense success in the literary world. (It is, moreover, imaginary. See Marie Goldsmith, _Psychologie Comparée_, page 211.) The defence of the practical value of instinct, with the same Romantic contempt of the rationalist as in Barrès, existed with J. J. Rousseau: ‘Conscience never deceives us; it is to the soul what instinct is to the body.... Modern philosophy, which only admits what can be explained, takes care not to admit the obscure faculty called instinct which, without acquired knowledge, seems to guide animals towards some end.’ (_Confession de foi du vicaire savoyard._) [138] ‘If the utility which results from a man’s occupations determined our praise, the inventor of the plough would deserve the praise of being a great mind far more than Aristotle, Galilei, and M. Descartes.’ (Bayle.) Fontenelle and Voltaire have pointed out the utility of certain studies which were considered useless; they never meant that those who cultivated these studies while they thought them useless were therefore contemptible. [139] See above, page 54. [140] Or moral. Barrès denounces the ‘immorality’ of the scholar who shows the part played by chance in history. Compare Michelet’s remark, ‘respect kills history.’