From this time until the _coup d'etat_ of February 8, 1913, there was no large organized resistance to the Madero Administration, although banditism increased at an alarming rate in all parts of the Republic. The Diaz-Reyes outburst, in Mexico City on February 8, 1913, which resulted in the death of Madero and Suarez and the elevation of Huerta to practical military dictatorship, was brought about by the adherents of the old regime, who looked upon Madero's extinction as a punishment meted out to a criminal who had raised the slaves against their masters. This view prevailed to a considerable extent in Mexico south of San Luis Potosi. In the North, however, the people almost as a whole (at least 90 per cent. in Sonera, and only to a slightly lesser extent in the other provinces) saw in it the cold-blooded murder of their political idol at the hands of unscrupulous moneyed interests and of adherents of the old regime of the days of Porfirio Diaz. The resentment was general in the North--this new, largely Americanized North, Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila, organized the resistance in the provinces of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas, while Maytorena, the governor of Sonora, and Pesqueira (later in Washington, D.C., as Carranza's representative), with Obregon as the head of their military forces, rapidly cleared that State of Federals, with the exception of the port of Guaymas. These fights were no mere bloodless affairs, but stubbornly contested, with heavy casualties, as a decided principle was involved in the conflict. Villa, the old bandit and personal enemy of Huerta, organized a force in Sonora, and Urbina did likewise in northern Durango. Arms, and especially money to buy them with, were hard to get. Funds were obtained from the tariff at ports of entry, internal taxation, amounting at times to practical confiscation, contributions, and gifts from various sources. It is said that the Madero family put aside $1,000,000, gold, for this purpose. Though a few individuals went over to the Constitutionalist cause, the Mexican regular army remained true to the _ad interim_ Government. The revolutionists either held or rapidly possessed themselves of the great railroad lines in the majority of cases. Huerta, who is an excellent organizer, soon appreciated the magnitude of the revolt and rushed troops to the north as rapidly as possible, his strategy being to hold all railroad lines and cities with strong columns which would force the revolutionists to operate in the intervals between the railroads. Then Huerta, with these columns as a supporting framework, pushed out mobile columns for the destruction of the rebel bands.