The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
He cannot be accounted fortunate in his biographer. The shadows of the
picture are so deep that the true lineaments of the man cannot now be
clearly discerned. But he who tries to play a double part, and fails
in the attempt, as Histiæus did, is not likely to occupy an honourable
place in history. He seems to have been of great and selfish ambition,
without the capacity to form a judgment as to the means requisite to
carry it out, and without any scruple as to the means he did adopt. He
figures consequently as a scheming but somewhat futile villain. He had
made up his mind that his main endeavour must be to win the confidence
of Darius, and that, if he won this, he could afford to ignore the
great officials. He forgot how far a cry it was from Susa to Sardes. He
wished at all costs to rule the Asiatic Greek—independent of Persia,
if he could; under Persia, if he could not; but not under any satrap
at Sardes or elsewhere. His plan, well conceived, but prematurely
executed, of gaining a _point d’appui_ in Thrace, gave away the whole
design at its very inception. There followed years of exile at Susa.
He returned to the coast to find the revolt undecided. He had, or
thought he had, two alternative cards to play: either to help in the
suppression of the revolt, and to make Darius believe that he had been
mainly instrumental in its suppression, or to take the lead in the
rising. But Artaphernes forced his hand, and he had no alternative but
to play his second card. It might have been effective, had he been
allowed to bide his time; but the premature display of it spoiled his
whole game,—in fact, the Greeks would have none of him.
And in the last scene of all, at Chios, Thasos, and Lesbos, his curse
is still upon him. He again miscalculated the means necessary to
effect his design in the limited time within which it could possibly
be successful. His cleverness was greater than his ability. He
possessed the finesse of a schemer, but lacked the practical reason of
the man of action.
His capture must be attributed to the spring of the year 493,
inasmuch as his army was engaged in reaping the spring crops in the
neighbourhood of Atarneus at the time at which it was attacked by
Harpagos.
The rest of the tale of the revolt is soon told.
The Persian fleet, having wintered at Miletus, proceeded in the spring
of 493 to reduce the island states. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos fell
into their hands. Herodotus reports that they “netted” these islands,
that is to say, swept them from end to end with a line of men with
joined hands stretching from sea to sea. If the story be in any sense
literally true, it probably means that the Persians were anxious to get
hold of prominent refugees. Nothing is said as to what they did with
those they captured.
◆H. vi. 32.◆
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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