The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
From (1) and (2_a_) he concluded that the system prevalent in his time
of appointing one of the strategi as superior to his colleagues in the
command of some special expedition or department prevailed at the time
of Marathon; that is to say, that Miltiades was in a position analogous
to that which Perikles had held on several occasions in Herodotus’ own
time.
Still, he is evidently uncertain on this point; and he accounts for
Miltiades’ position by assuming a system of diurnal rotation in the
command, ◆H. vi. 110.◆ and by representing that some of Miltiades’
colleagues surrendered their days of command to him.
From (2_b_) he draws the very important conclusion that the polemarch
was no longer commander-in-chief.
He has ante-dated this particular application of the system of lot by
three years. It is obvious that the Athenian citizen would not entrust
his life when serving in the field to a commander appointed by such a
method. His belief in Providence, as represented by the lot, had its
limitations. Herodotus was probably well aware that, from the moment of
the introduction of the lot into the election of the archons, the
polemarch had ceased to command the army.
Perhaps, after all, the main difficulty which would be experienced by
an inquirer in the latter half of the fifth century into the system
of command existent in 490, would arise from the fact that that year
fell within what was a comparatively brief period of transition in
the Athenian army system, intermediate between the old organization
existent before the reforms of Kleisthenes, and the completely new
organization which was introduced between 490 and 480, probably in
487, and prevailed with hardly any modification during the rest of the
century.
The reforms of Kleisthenes, by substituting ten tribes for four, had
rendered a certain amount of army reorganization necessary. Thereafter
the army was constituted in ten tribal regiments, each commanded by one
of the strategi:[75] “they chose the generals by tribes, one from each
tribe.” What other _novelties_ there were in the system we do not know;
but of the system itself, as existent at Marathon, we derive a certain
amount of knowledge from the Aristotelian treatise on the Constitution
of Athens, and with its aid we may now proceed to set in order the
confused and mistaken account of Herodotus.
That treatise distinctly states (Ch. 22) that the polemarch was
chief-in-command at Marathon. This is, perhaps, a conclusion at which
a close student of Herodotus’ uncertain account would arrive. ◆H. vi.
109.◆ The attitude of Miltiades towards him at the celebrated Council
of War is that of an official inferior. His command of the right wing
would argue that he was, at least _de jure_, the chief of the army.
Of the position of the strategi the treatise says but little. It
seems certain, however, that, in addition to commanding the tribal
contingents, they formed, as Herodotus implies, a council of war
presided over by the polemarch.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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