The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
There seems to have been a belief current in Greece when first the news
of the coming expedition was noised abroad, that it was a punitive one
aimed, like that of Datis and Artaphernes, against Athens.[105] The
then recent events of 490 would lend colour to such a belief. When
the magnitude of the coming expedition became known, and reports as
to its real intent came across the Ægean, Greece as a whole began to
think that the danger was more widely threatening than had been first
supposed. Delphi did not share in this change of opinion, and continued
to regard the expedition as aimed against Athens alone. Holding this
view, she adopted the double course of trying to remove the cause of
offence by getting the Athenians to leave Greece, and of doing all
in her power to prevent Greece as a whole from being involved in the
matter. She was successful in preventing Crete and Argos from joining
in the Hellenic defence, and the second half of the first oracle
delivered to Athens, if a part of the original version, is a threat,
uttered possibly about the time of the expedition to Thessaly, to those
powers other than Athens who seemed inclined to make the question
a pan-Hellenic one. Whatever Delphi thought, Sparta had by that time
fully made up her mind that the danger was one which threatened the
whole of Greece, and was consequently exceedingly alarmed at the tenour
of the advice given by Delphi to the Athenians, the only result of
which would be to rob her of an adjunct to the defence whose value she
fully appreciated,—the Athenian fleet No time was lost in bringing
pressure to bear on Delphi. The result was the second oracle delivered
to Athens, which, in spite of its ambiguous wording, clearly advocated
a policy in strong contrast to that which the first response had laid
down.
The account of these oracles, which is, evidently, from the
chronological point of view, of the nature of a digression in
Herodotus’ history, is succeeded by the description of certain events
which must have taken place in the autumn and winter of 481.
Several measures are described which were adopted by the Council of
the Greeks which had been formed to take the necessary steps to resist
the coming invasion. A settlement was made of the outstanding disputes
between the Greek States, and especially of the war between Athens and
Ægina.
This settlement must, apparently, be attributed to the autumn of 481,
for the measures which were next taken, ◆H. vii. 145.◆ which are
expressly stated to have been subsequent to this reconciliation, were
contemporaneous with the presence of the Persian Army at Sardes, ◆H.
vii. 37.◆ and belong therefore to the winter of 481–480. The measures
were: the seeding of spies into Asia; the despatching of ambassadors to
solicit aid from Gelon of Syracuse, from Crete, from Corcyra, and from
Argos.
[Illustration: THE HARBOUR OF CORCYRA.]
[_To face page_ 241.
]
#CORCYRA.#
◆H. vii. 146, 174.◆
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