The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
The tale of Thermopylæ is one of the strangest in the history of the
world, as well as one of the most famous. It is not merely that some of
the details of that most dramatic story are difficult to understand:
the motive of the main plot of the tragedy is obscure. Why was not the
defence of the pass a real effort on the part of those Greek states
which contributed to it? Of the unreality there can be no doubt.
Herodotus’ narrative makes it quite clear; and this is all the more
remarkable, as the historian himself is apparently wholly unaware that
what he relates will give this particular impression.
Thucydides had no illusions on the subject. In his account of the first
congress of the Peloponnesian allies preceding the Peloponnesian war,
he puts words into the mouth of the Corinthians which significantly
show what view Greece in after-times took of the Spartan action at this
period of the war:—
“The Mede, we ourselves know, had time to come from the ends of the
earth to Peloponnese, without any force of yours worthy of the name
advancing to meet him.”
The troops which were sent to the pass were:—
◆H. vii. 202.◆
Peloponnesians: 300 Spartans; 1000 Tegeans and Mantineans; 126
Orchomenians from Arcadia; 1000 from the rest of Arcadia; 400
Corinthians; 200 from Phlius; 30 Mykenæans.
Northern Greeks: 700 Thespians; 400 Thebans; 1000 Phocians; and the
whole force of the Opuntian Locrians.
Leaving out of the calculation the indeterminate number of the Opuntian
Locrians,—not a very serious deduction either as regards quantity
or quality, if the general military history of this people be any
criterion,—and adding the light-armed which would be present with
the Spartan force, a total of 7300 is arrived at as the sum of the
defenders of this all-important passage. Herodotus, whose narrative
of Thermopylæ is conspicuously drawn from Lacedæmonian sources,
is at considerable pains to emphasize the intention of the
Peloponnesians to send reinforcements. ◆H. vii. 203.◆ The Opuntian
Locrians are told that the force sent is merely an advance guard,
and that “the rest of the allies might be expected any day;” and are
further comforted, so Herodotus says, with a piece of philosophy after
the historian’s own heart: “The invader of Greece is not divine but
human; and there neither is nor will be the man who is not liable to
misfortune from the day of his birth; moreover, the greater the man,
the greater the misfortune.” This affords an unparalleled example of
the effectiveness of proverbial philosophy in war.
◆H. vii. 206.◆
“The men with Leonidas the Spartans despatched first, in order that
the other allies on seeing them might join in the expedition and not
medise, if they heard that they were delaying. They intended later,
the Carnean festival being the momentary obstacle, after celebrating
the feast and after leaving a garrison in Sparta, to come up _en
masse_ with all speed.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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