Part, however, of the Spartan force was outside the wall, the men being engaged in exercise and in combing their hair. Having ascertained their numbers, the scout returned to Xerxes with his report. His description of what was going on surprised the king, who appealed to the Spartan Demaratos for an explanation. The latter told him that it was the national custom of the Spartans to adorn themselves before facing the danger of death in battle, and warned him that he must expect a stubborn resistance. ◆H. vii. 210.◆ The king, it is said, did not credit this, and allowed four days to pass “expecting ever that they would run away.” Xerxes’ motive for the delay was probably somewhat different from that given by Herodotus. #THE FIRST ATTACK.# The king thought, no doubt, that his fleet would within a few days force the passage of the Euripus, and that, the position of the Greeks being thus turned, they would have to retreat, and would thus save him the inevitable losses which must result from an attempt to force a pass so strong. On the fifth day his impatience got the better of him, and he began a fierce assault with his Median and Kissian troops. After the Persians, the Medes enjoyed the greatest reputation in the army. In spite of the disparity of numbers, it was an unequal contest. Numbers were indeed of little avail, the passage being very narrow,—only fifty feet in width—and the Greeks having either flank protected by the mountain and the sea. But it was in respect to actual arms that the disparity was greatest. The Greek hoplite, with his heavy defensive armour and longer spear, was far more than a match for the Mede, who practically lacked defensive armour, and whose weapons of offence were of an inferior character. The battle lasted all day; ◆H. vii. 211.◆ for when it became clear that the Medes could effect nothing, Xerxes sent his picked Persian troops, the Immortals, to the assault. Even these signally failed to make an impression on the Greek defence. The excellence of the Lacedæmonian drill and discipline seems to have been remarkable. They employed tactics which very few troops in the world could employ in a narrow space in face of immensely superior numbers:—an advance; then a pretended retreat, to draw the enemy on; and then once more a right-about-face to the attack. The object of this was, no doubt, to keep the enemy at close quarters. ◆Xen. Anab. iii. 3, 9.◆ The one thing they had to fear was that the lighter armed foe should confine himself to an attack with missiles, in which form of fighting they must have suffered severely, without being able to retaliate in adequate fashion. The attack was repeated next day. The Persians hoped to win the pass by sheer weight of numbers, knowing that they could afford to lose ten men for every one of the enemy whom they placed _hors de combat_. But again the attack failed.