The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
It seems an essential factor in the situation that Leonidas believed
in and was able to persuade the Thespians and, it may be, the Thebans
too, of the possibility of still maintaining the pass. Had the division
sent to meet Hydarnes done its duty with energy, it is highly probable,
judging from the history of the previous fighting, that the event would
have justified his confidence. What happened to that division of two
thousand eight hundred men will never be known. It may be that for
some reason it arrived too late, and found the Persians in too strong
a force at Drakospilia. It may be that it never attempted to carry out
the orders, and retreated straightway through the east gate, and so to
Elatæa. Probably the latter was the case. Had there been a reasonable
excuse for their conduct it would have survived in history. But was
there _no_ excuse for their vanishing from the scene? They were face
to face with a fearful danger, greater even than the danger which had
faced them for a week past, great though that had been. They must
have been suffering under a bitter sense of desertion, left to their
fate, as it were, by those who sent them from the Isthmus. And who but
Sparta was responsible for this? “Had they not done enough?” they may
have argued. Were they to blame if, deserted themselves, they deserted
others? And who were those “others?” Spartans, men of the race which
had wished to sacrifice them; Thebans of suspicious loyalty; Thespians,
who were—well, not Peloponnesians. And so they could go off with half
a conscience, if not a whole one. Such reasoning would not do them
honour; but men, if dishonourably treated themselves, are but too apt,
in their bitter resentment, to lose the finer sense of honour.
The story of their shame but half-survived; Herodotus caught some echo
of it. Those who lived to tell it had most interest in concealing
it. The dead men at Thermopylæ could tell no tales; and the Thebans
were too much discredited to obtain credit. There was a conspiracy of
silence. The inaction of the Spartan authorities had borne terrible
fruit,—far more terrible, it may be believed, than the authorities ever
expected it would bear. Leonidas had been deserted and had died with
his brave band. It was no good blaming the allies who deserted him,
even had it been possible under the circumstances to establish the fact
of their desertion. These, too, could have retaliated with a tale which
would have brought discredit, or even infamy, on those who were really
responsible for the disaster.
Thus it was possible to conceal the truth, and the field was open
for invention. It was not difficult to supply a motive for a courage
so grand as that which Leonidas had displayed,—the motive of
self-sacrifice. That was absolutely the only motive which could account
to the world for the extraordinary circumstances of his death; and it
had the merit of being true.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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