The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
1. The Greeks had made up their minds to face the Persians at
Artemisium. Is it credible that so small a disaster should have led
to the adoption of a resolution, the effect of which, under the
circumstances, must have deranged the whole plan of campaign?
2. If such a panic had taken place for a reason so insignificant, is
it probable that any human power could have induced the Greeks to
return a few days later to their former station?
3. Is it credible that they should have retreated without warning the
garrison at Thermopylæ which would in that case have been
sacrificed?
4. If that garrison had been warned, would it not have retreated from
that advanced post in the same way that the army had withdrawn
from Tempe?
5. It is extremely unlikely that the withdrawal was made at night. It
is almost certain that it must have been made on the morning after
the news had been received, by which time the storm which burst
upon the Persian fleet at the Sepiad strand had already begun.
6. The motive alleged is in the highest degree suspicious, because
all through the narrative the services of the Athenians in keeping
the fleet at Artemisium are emphasized in the most marked manner.
It is probable that the motive given is a pure fabrication invented
at Athens and current at Athens in after-time. It is also probable
that the real reason for the withdrawal of the Greek fleet was the
impossibility of remaining in the North Euripus during the storm.
Such storms spring up with astonishing suddenness in these seas,
and give little or no warning of their approach; and it is probable
that the Greek fleet, caught unprepared, had to run for it to the
inner strait, where, once round the corner of Eubœa, it would be
sheltered by the mountains which form the great precipices on the
Euripus north of Chalkis. Whether it went to Chalkis or not, it is,
of course, impossible to say. It is probable it did not do so, for
Mount Kandili[131] ceases before Chalkis is reached, and the narrow
part of the Strait is exposed to the east and north-east. There is no
difficulty in identifying the nature of the storm. It blew on shore on
the Sepiad strand, and therefore must have been one of those E.N.E.
gales from the Black Sea, which are the most violent and most dangerous
of the storm winds of the Ægean. They may occur at any time of year.
Such a storm would blow right down the north bend of the Euripus.
The army at Thermopylæ must have known of the retirement of the fleet;
but it must have known also that there was every intention of returning
to the former station so soon as the weather allowed. For that reason
it held its ground.
The adventures of the ten Persian ships did not end with their capture
of the Athenian vessels. Three of them came to grief on the rock called
Murmex, which is in the fairway just at the entrance of the channel.
#THE STORM AT THE SEPIAD STRAND.#
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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