The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
The subsequent action of the Greek commanders is in accord with such
a situation and such a design. They had not hitherto ventured to
attack the Persian. They were now forced to do so. Not until the fleet
at Aphetæ had been rendered incapable of making a movement down the
Euripus could the Greek fleet venture to meet the danger from the
south. And so the first attack took place that very night. Herodotus’
account of the action is a curious one,—that of a man who had heard
talk of certain naval technicalities without understanding them. These
very Greeks, who have been described as having, a few days before, fled
to Chalkis in consequence of the capture of three of their vessels,
and as having contemplated flight to mid Greece at the mere sight of
the Persian fleet, are now represented as making a quasi-experimental
attack on the foe they so much dreaded, from motives of purely
professional interest. “They wished to make trial of the Persian mode
of fighting, and to practise the manœuvre of cutting the line.” [141]
From the point of view of military history, the account of the first
engagement, as given by Diodorus, conveys a much stronger impression
of accuracy than that of Herodotus. ◆H. xi. 12.◆ Both represent the
Greeks as the attacking party; but Diodorus gives an excellent tactical
motive for their taking the offensive. A council of war being held,
all the commanders save Themistocles were in favour of remaining on
the defensive. He, however, persuaded them to adopt his plan of the
offensive by pointing out to them the advantage they would enjoy as
the attacking party, in that they, with their whole force prepared
for battle, would be able to choose their own time for attack, and
must take unawares an enemy whose fleet was not concentrated at one
anchorage.
This account is strongly supported by the fact that there is no single
harbour at that extremity of the Magnesian peninsula which could
accommodate more than a fraction of the Persian fleet, so that it would
necessarily be distributed over a considerable extent of coast-line.
On the general course of the engagement the two accounts are in
agreement. The Greeks, as might be expected, gained at first some
considerable success;—Herodotus says they took thirty ships; but,
when the whole of the enemy’s fleet had collected, the combat became
obstinate and indecisive, until the fall of night put an end to it.
◆H. viii. 12.◆
It was on the evening of this day that the second of those storms
took place which were destined to be so fatal to the Persian fleet.
#STORM AT THE HOLLOWS OF EUBŒA.# The quarter from which it came is not
expressly stated by Herodotus; but his accounts of its effects on the
north and south of Eubœa respectively leave no doubt that it was a gale
from the south or S.S.W.[142] At Aphetæ it caused considerable
alarm but little damage, the only effect being that the wreckage from
the battle of the afternoon was thrust in upon the Persian fleet.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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