The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
people, if they, as well as the land, fell into the enemy’s power.
It is noticeable that in choosing their places of refuge they were
careful not to give any hostages to the Peloponnesians. Trœzen was the
base of naval operations. Ægina and Salamis were islands. All three
were therefore within reach of their own powerful fleet, and out of
reach of the Peloponnesian army at the Isthmus.
The news that the fleet from Artemisium had put in at Salamis brought
thither the rest of the Greek fleet, which seems to have been gathering
for some time previously at the port of Pogon[151] in Trœzen, near
the east end of the Argolic peninsula. The numbers now available were
considerably larger than those which had fought at Artemisium.[152]
It seems to be implied by Herodotus’ language, as well as by the fact
that their addition would raise the numbers of the Athenian fleet
to two hundred, that the fifty-three Attic vessels were not part of
the _original_ fleet at Artemisium. If this be so, the net increase
in the number of triremes at Salamis is forty-two. #THE GREEK FLEET
AT SALAMIS.# Some of the original contingents, notably those of
the Æginetans and Lacedæmonians, were increased; and several small
contingents were added which had not been present at Artemisium.
The almost absolute apathy of the Western States and of Magna Græcia
is most marked. Corcyra is unrepresented.[153] The great Kroton
sends but one ship. Had Salamis turned out differently, they might
have had bitter cause to regret their lack of patriotism. It is,
however, possible that Magna Græcia, and even the towns of the extreme
north-west of Greece, had their attention distracted at this time by
the immanence of the life-and-death struggle between Gelo and the
Carthaginians in Sicily.
It is also noticeable that Herodotus makes one of his customary
mistakes in addition, putting the number of the fleet, exclusive of
pentekonters, at three hundred and seventy-eight; whereas, according to
his own list, it should be three hundred and sixty-six.[154]
As at Artemisium, Eurybiades commanded the fleet. The Athenians,
according to Herodotus, supplied the best ships.
Though the fleet had assembled at Salamis, it was by no means certain
that it would remain there. The gathering had been designed to cover
and assist the withdrawal of the population of Attica. It was quite
certain that there would be a large party in favour of withdrawal
to the Isthmus, and the risks, which have already been pointed out,
attendant upon the occupation of the strait were so palpable, that they
could hardly fail to afford a strong argument in favour of the
Peloponnesian policy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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