The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
It is, of course, a commonplace of criticism to say that Herodotus
gives us no account of the general movements or manœuvres of the two
fleets on the actual day of the battle, save that he mentions that the
Æginetan vessels fell on the Phœnician ships which the Athenians put to
flight. What I may call the enunciation of my proposition is this:—
This failure of information in this part of his narrative is due to
the fact that he had already, in the previous part of it, used up his
information on this point.
He antedated a movement made on the night preceding the battle to the
previous afternoon, and further antedated the movements in the battle
itself to the night preceding the battle.
It is curious and noticeable that, when this correction is made in
Herodotus’ dating, and in the mistaken accounts of movements which the
chronological error entailed, there is so close a resemblance between
the narratives of Herodotus and Diodorus that they may be suspected of
having been derived from sources which, if not absolutely identical,
were close in similarity.
The fleet of Xerxes was now at Phaleron, in the bay lying east
of the peninsula on which stood the town of Piræus. After spending
three days at Histiæa, subsequent to the departure of the army from
Thermopylæ, it had taken three days more to reach Phaleron. It is
probable, therefore, that it arrived there shortly before the army
reached Attic territory. Herodotus is of opinion that, despite the
losses at the Sepiad strand, at Thermopylæ, at Artemisium, and in the
Hollows of Eubœa, the net strength of the land and sea forces was,
owing to the accession of reinforcements, not less than before these
losses were incurred. For the numbers of the land forces he makes
out something resembling a case. It is probable that the addition
of the full contingents of Dorians and Locrians, and of all the
Bœotians, except the Platæans and Thespians, largely, if not entirely,
compensated for the losses suffered at Thermopylæ, great as they had
been. But that the naval contingents of Karystos, Andros, Tenos, and
the other islands, can have in any sensible measure compensated for the
losses suffered at Sepias, Artemisium, and the Hollows of Eubœa, is
plainly absurd. Herodotus has evidently, in his desire to magnify the
force opposed to the Greeks at Salamis, forgotten the enormity of the
losses he represents the Persians to have suffered in the two storms.
◆H. viii. 67–69.◆
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