The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
He then enters upon the description of that affair at Naxos which
immediately preceded the Ionian revolt.
The story of these operations in Thrace which are subsequent to and
the direct outcome of the so-called Scythian expedition, is one of the
most obscure chapters in Herodotus’ history. He had manifestly the
greatest difficulty in obtaining information with regard to the events
of the time. That which he did get he got from various sources, whose
discrepancies he only partially succeeded in reconciling.
The modern writer is obliged to face the historical situation with the
courage alike of necessity and despair; of necessity, inasmuch as the
history of these years is of the utmost importance in the story of
the Persian relations with Europe, and, consequently, with Greece; of
despair, in that he must feel that detailed criticism of such material
must border on mere eclecticism. On the main outlines the question it
is, however, possible to arrive at conclusions which have some sound
foundation in evidence.
It seems quite clear that these campaigns of Megabazos and Otanes
aimed at the reduction of the Thracian races in Europe. In ordering
them Darius was probably pursuing the policy which had underlain the
so-called Scythian expedition. His stay at Sardes, for what cannot have
been less than the better part of a year after his return from that
expedition, indicates certainly that he considered that the affairs of
the westernmost extremity of his empire demanded his personal attention
more imperatively than affairs elsewhere, and may well imply that
they were of a nature to cause him some anxiety. There had certainly
been some disaster in the Scythian expedition. It had been followed
by the revolt, not merely of the towns on the European side of the
Propontis, but of places like Antandros in the Troad, which Otanes had
subsequently to reduce.
The strategic policy observed in the campaign of Megabazos is striking
in that the revolted cities are practically ignored. Its results are
in many respects uncertain. Herodotus describes them in a descending
scale;—first, as having consisted of the subjugation of all the
Thracians; secondly, as being confined to the conquest of the coast
regions; thirdly, as leaving even the conquest of these regions
incomplete in the neighbourhood of Mount Pangæus. #DESIGNS OF DARIUS IN
EUROPE.# It has been pointed out that the first two statements may be
reconciled as implying subjugation in two different degrees; but
the third constitutes, in whatever way it be regarded, a significant
exception.
As far as the revolted cities are concerned, it is possible that Darius
thought he could bide his time for dealing with them, and that the
larger Thracian policy first demanded his attention. The cities were
not powerful enough to do any active damage meanwhile.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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