The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
But Aristagoras, as his subsequent language at Sparta makes clear,
was convinced that the Greek hoplite was infinitely more than a match
for any soldiery which Persia could put into the field; and others
apparently shared his opinion. The events of twenty years later proved
the truth of his general judgment on this point. He and his fellow
conspirators may have made a mistake, when they took the offensive on
land, in expecting too much from the land forces which the insurgents
could put into the field. But in great ventures great risks have to be
taken; and the attack on the Persian base made at the beginning of the
year 498, had it been successful, must have brilliantly justified the
plan.
It is easy now, in the light of knowledge after the event, to see
that, if the revolt was to be successful, it must succeed on both
elements:—on sea, because only by means of the fleet could the
concentration of a large land force be brought about: on land, because
only on that element could an effective blow be struck against the
Persian dominion in Western Asia.
Aristagoras’ estimate of the strategic position of the insurgents
was singularly justified by the history of the subsequent warfare of
the century. The sea was, indeed, and must be, the Ionian base. The
strategic weakness of the position of the cities rendered any other
alternative impossible. But ages of fighting were destined to prove
that no mortal blow could be inflicted on Persia by sea alone. The
Ægean might be made a Hellenic lake. The islands on the Asian coast
might be liberated. But so long as Persia maintained her hold upon the
continent, the cities of the mainland must be ultimately at the mercy
of a great land power holding the central position in Western Asia. If
the revolt was to be successful, it was at this central position that
the blow must be struck. Sardes must be the objective of the insurgents.
#FIRST ACT OF REVOLT.#
It was evident that nothing could be done with the fleet until the
tyrants who were in command of its contingents were removed. ◆H. v.
37.◆ A certain Iatragoras was accordingly sent to seize them. He
did so “by a trick,” whose nature is not specified. He seized four
who are mentioned by name, and “many others.” It is a remarkable
fact that not one of the four is Ionian. Two are Æolan, and two are
Helleno-Carian[18] Aristagoras, of his own accord, “nominally” laid
aside the tyranny of Miletus. He then proceeded to depose other tyrants
in Ionia, besides those whom he had caught upon the fleet, and handed
over the whole number to their various cities. The Mytilenians slew
their tyrant Koës; the others were allowed to depart. Inasmuch as
those tyrants had all been acting in the interests of Persia, their
deposition was necessarily the first step in the revolt.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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