"The Greatest Failure in All History": A Critical Examination of the Actual Workings of Bolshevism in RussiaSpargo, John
History
"The Greatest Failure in All History": A Critical Examination of the Actual Workings of Bolshevism in Russia
Spargo, John
Communism -- Russia
Rykov calls attention to the decline in the production of hides for
leather and of wool. During the first six months of 1919 the hides
collected amounted to about one million pieces, but the total for the
whole of 1920 was not expected to exceed 650,000 pieces. “The number
of hides delivered to the government decreases with every succeeding
month.” There was also to be observed “a decline in the quantity of
live stock, especially those kinds which furnish wool for our woolen
mills.” But perhaps the most impressive part of his report is that
dealing with the fuel shortage. Though adjacent to large coal-fields,
as well as to vast forests, Moscow in the winter of 1919-20 lacked fuel
“even for heating the infirmaries and hospitals.” For the winter of
1919-20 the Council of People’s Commissaries had fixed the necessary
quantity of wood for fuel to be produced at 12,000,000 to 14,000,000
cubic sagenes (one cubic sagene being equal to two cubic meters). But
the Administrations which were charged with the work forwarded to the
railroads and to the rivers less than 2,500,000 sagenes. It must be
added that of these same 2,500,000 sagenes the Soviet Administrations
were not able to transport to the cities and industrial centers more
than a very small quantity, and “even the minimum program of supply of
fuel for the factories of Moscow could not be carried out because of
the lack of means of transport.”
Bad as this is, the coal-supply is in a worse condition yet. “Things
are going badly for the production of coal and petroleum” we are told.
Upon their reoccupation of the Donetz Basin the Bolsheviki found coal
on the surface, ready to be shipped, which was estimated at 100,000,000
poods. “But until the reconstruction of bridges and re-establishment
of railroad communications in the Donetz territory these coal-supplies
cannot be utilized.” Of course the havoc wrought by war in the Donetz
Basin must be taken into account and full allowance made for it. But
what is the explanation of conditions in the coal-fields of the Moscow
region, which from the very first has been under Bolshevist rule, and
never included in the territory of war, civil or otherwise? Says Rykov:
The fields of Moscow not only have not given what they ought
to have given for the fuel-supply of Soviet Russia, but the
production of coal remained in 1919 at the same level as in
1918 and it did not reach the figure of 30,000,000 poods;
whereas, under the Czar at the time of the Imperialist War, the
Czar’s officials, with the aid of prisoners of war, knew how to
increase the production of coal in the Moscow fields to the
extent of 40,000,000 poods and even more.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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