The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 1 (of 2)Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy
The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy, Ancient
Two precepts stand out before all others, which, trivial as they
may seem, are uttered from the very soul of Greek experience, ‘Be
moderate,’ and, ‘Know thyself.’ Their joint observance constitutes the
characteristic virtue of Sôphrosynê, which means all that we understand
by temperance, and a great deal more besides; so much, in fact, that
very clever Greeks were hard set to define it, and very wise Greeks
could pray for it as the fairest gift of the gods.[48] Let us suppose
that each individual has a sphere of activity marked out for him by
his own nature and his special environment; then to discern clearly
the limits of that sphere and to keep within them would be Sôphrosynê,
while the discernment, taken alone, would be wisdom. The same
self-restraint operating as a check on interference with other spheres
would be justice; while the expansive force by which a man fills up
his entire sphere and guards it against aggressions may be called
courage. Thus we are enabled to comprehend the many-sided significance
of Sôphrosynê, to see how it could stand both for a particular virtue
and for all virtuousness whatever. We need only glance at Homer’s
poems, and in particular at the _Iliad_—a much deeper as well as a
more brilliant work than the _Odyssey_—to perceive how very early this
demand for moderation combined with self-knowledge had embodied itself
in Greek thought. Agamemnon violates the rights of Achilles under the
influence of immoderate passion, and through ignorance of how little
we can accomplish without the hero’s assistance. Achilles, again,
carries his vindictiveness too far, and suffers in consequence. But
his self-knowledge is absolutely perfect; conscious that he is first
in the field while others are better in council, he never undertakes
a task to which his powers are not fully adequate; nor does he enter
on his final work of vengeance without a clear consciousness of the
speedy death which its completion will entail on himself. Hector,
too, notwithstanding ominous forebodings, knows his duty and does it,
but with much less just an estimate of his own powers, leading him to
pursue his success too far, and then, when the tide has turned, not
permitting him to make a timely retreat within the walls of Troy. So
with the secondary characters. Patroclus also oversteps the limits
of moderation, and pays the penalty with his life. Diomed silently
bears the unmerited rebuke of Agamemnon, but afterwards recalls it at
a most effective moment, when rising to oppose the craven counsels
of the great king. This the Greeks called observing opportunity,
and opportunism was with them, as with French politicians, a form
of moderation.[49] Down at the very bottom of the scale Thersites
and Dolon are signal examples of men who do not know their sphere
and suffer for their folly. In the _Odyssey_, Odysseus is a nearly
perfect type of wisdom joined with self-control, erring, if we remember
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