The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy
The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy, Ancient
With regard to the universal soul of Nature, there is, indeed, no
difficulty at all. In giving a sensible realisation to the noetic
ideas, she suffers no degradation or pollution by contact with the
lower elements of matter. Enthroned on the outer verge of the cosmos,
she governs the whole course of Nature by a simple exercise of
volition, and in the enjoyment of a felicity which remains undisturbed
by passion or desire. But just as we have seen the supreme Nous
resolving itself into a multitude of individual intelligences, so also
does the cosmic soul produce many lesser or partial souls of which
our own is one. Now these derivative souls cannot all be equal, for
that would be to defeat the purpose of creation, which is to realise
all the possibilities of creation from the highest to the lowest.
Thus each has an office corresponding to her place in the scale of
perfection.[452] We may say of the human soul that she stoops to
conquer. Her mission is to cope with the more recalcitrant forms of
matter. It is to the struggle with their impurities that the troubles
and passions of our life are due. By yielding to earthly temptations,
we suffer a second fall, and one much more real than the first; by
overcoming them, as is perfectly in our power to do, we give scope and
exercise to faculties which would otherwise have remained dormant
and unknown. Moreover, our soul retains the privilege of returning
to her former abode, enriched by the experience acquired in this
world, and with that clearer perception of good which the knowledge
of its opposite alone can supply. Nay, paradoxical as the assertion
may seem, she has not entirely descended to earth, but remains in
partial communication with the noetic world by virtue of her reasoning
faculty; that is to say, when its intuitions are not darkened and
disturbed by the triumph of sensuous impressions over the lower soul.
On this and on many other occasions, Plotinus betrays a glimmering
consciousness that his philosophy is purely subjective, and that its
attempted transcendentalism is, in truth, a projection of psychological
distinctions into the external world. Starting with the familiar
division of human nature into body, soul, and spirit (or reason),
he endeavours to find an objective counterpart for each. Body is
represented by the material universe, soul by the animating principle
of Nature, reason by the extramundane Nous. Under these three heads is
comprised the totality of real existence; but existence itself has to
be accounted for by a principle lying above and beyond it, which has
still to be obtained by an effort of abstraction from the data that
self-consciousness supplies.[453]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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