The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy
The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy, Ancient
The One cannot, properly speaking, be an object of knowledge, but is
apprehended by something higher than knowledge. This is why Plato
calls it ineffable and indescribable. What we can describe is the
way to the view, not the view itself. The soul which has never been
irradiated with the light of that supreme splendour, nor filled with
the passionate joy of a lover finding rest in the contemplation of his
beloved, cannot be given that experience in words. But the beatific
vision is open to all. He from whom it is hidden has only himself
to blame. Let him break away from the restraints of sense and place
himself under the guidance of philosophy, that philosophy which leads
from matter to spirit, from soul to Nous, from Nous to the One.
Plotinus himself, we are told, reached the climax of complete
unification several times in his life, Porphyry only once, in the
sixty-eighth year of his age. Probably the condition so denominated
was a species of hypnotic trance. Its importance in the Neo-Platonic
system has been considerably exaggerated, and on the strength of this
single point some critics have summarily disposed of Plotinus and his
whole school as unreasoning mystics. Mysticism is a vague word capable
of very various applications. In the present instance, we presume that
it is used to express a belief in the existence of some method for the
discovery of truth apart from tradition; observation, and reasoning.
And, taken in this sense, the Neo-Platonic method of arriving at a
full apprehension of the One would be considered an extreme instance
of mysticism. We must bear in mind, however, that Plotinus arrives
at an intellectual conception of absolute unity by the most strictly
logical process. It makes no difference that his reasoning is unsound,
for the same criticism applies to other philosophers who have never
been accused of mysticism. It may be said that after leading us up
to a certain point, reason is replaced by intuition. Rather, what
the ultimate intuition does is not to take the place of logic, but
to substitute a living realisation for an abstract and negative
conception. Moreover, the intuition is won not by forsaking logic,
but by straining its resources to the very utmost. Again, one great
characteristic of mysticism, as ordinarily understood, is to deny the
truth of common observation and reasoning. Now Plotinus never goes this
length. As we have already remarked, he does not even share Plato’s
distrust of sensible impressions, but rather follows the example of
Aristotle in recognising their validity within a certain sphere. Nor
does he mention having received any revelations of divine truth during
his intercourse with the absolute One. This alone marks an immense
difference between his ecstasies—if such they can be called—and those
of the Christian mystics with whom he is associated by M. Barthélemy
Saint-Hilaire.[464]
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