The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy
The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy, Ancient
And apart from these two orders—the objective
order of dynamical production in space and time, and the subjective
order of intelligibility in thought—there is no kind of succession that
we can conceive. Eternal relations, if they exist at all, must be
relations of co-existence, of resemblance, or of difference, continued
through infinite time. Wherever there is antecedence, the consequent
can only have existed for a finite time.
Some may think that we have pushed this point at unnecessary length.
But the Neo-Platonic method is not quite so obsolete as they, perhaps,
suppose. Whenever we repeat the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, we are
expressing our religious belief in the language of the Alexandrian
schools, thus pledging ourselves to metaphysical dogmas which we can
neither explain nor defend. Such terms as sonship and procession have
no meaning except when applied to relations conceived under the form of
time; and to predicate eternity of them is to reduce them to so much
unintelligible jargon.
An energy continually advancing through successive gradations, and
diminishing as it advances—such, as we have seen, is the conception of
existence offered by Plotinus. We have seen, also, how to explain the
genesis of one principle from another without the aid of supernatural
volition or of mechanical causation, he is compelled to press into
the service every sort of relationship by which two objects can be
connected, and to invest it with a dynamical significance which
only the phenomena of matter and motion can possess. But what he
chiefly relies on for guidance in this tortuous labyrinth of timeless
evolution, is the old Greek principle that contraries are generated
from one another. And with him, as with the earlier thinkers, all
contraries reduce themselves, in the last analysis, to the four great
antitheses of the One and the Many, Being and not-Being, the Same
and the Other, Rest and Motion. It matters nothing that he should
have followed Plato to the extent of co-ordinating five of these
terms as supreme archetypal Ideas, immediately resulting from the
self-consciousness of Nous, and themselves producing all other forms
of existence. They are used, quite independently of that derivation,
to explain the connexion of the various creative principles with one
another. Nous is deduced from its first cause as Being from not-Being,
as the Many from the One, as Difference from Identity, and as Motion
from Rest.[474] To explain the generation of Soul from Nous is a
more difficult problem. The One had originally been defined as the
antithetical cause of Nous, and therefore the latter could easily be
accounted for by simply reversing the analytical process; whereas Nous
had not been defined as the cause of Soul, but as the model whence her
creative Ideas are derived. Soul, in fact, is not opposed to anything;
she is the connecting link between sense and spirit. In this strait,
Plotinus seems to think that the antithesis between Rest and Motion
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