The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy
The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy, Ancient
Next to its bearing on the question of immortality, the Epicurean
psychology is most interesting as a contribution to the theory of
cognition. Epicurus holds that all our knowledge is derived from
experience, and all our experience, directly or indirectly, from the
presentations of sense. So far he says no more than would be admitted
by the Stoics, by Aristotle, and indeed by every Greek philosopher
except Plato. There is, therefore, no necessary connexion between
his views in this respect and his theory of ethics, since others had
combined the same views with a very different standard of action. It
is in discussing the vexed question of what constitutes the ultimate
criterion of truth that he shows to most disadvantage in comparison
with the more intellectual schools. He seems to have considered that
sensation supplies not only the matter but the form of knowledge; or
rather, he seems to have missed the distinction between matter and
form altogether. What the senses tell us, he says, is always true,
although we may draw erroneous inferences from their statements.[184]
But this only amounts to the identical proposition that we feel what
we feel; for it cannot be pretended that the order of our sensations
invariably corresponds to the actual order of things in themselves.
Even confining ourselves to individual sensations, or single groups of
sensations, there are some that do not always correspond to the same
objective reality, and others that do not correspond to any reality
at all; while, conversely, the same object produces a multitude of
different sensations according to the subjective conditions under which
it affects us. To escape from this difficulty, Epicurus has recourse
to a singularly crude theory of perception, borrowed from Empedocles
and the older atomists. What we are conscious of is, in each instance,
not the object itself, but an image composed of fine atoms thrown off
from the surfaces of bodies and brought into contact with the organs of
sense. Our perception corresponds accurately to an external image, but
the image itself is often very unlike the object whence it originally
proceeded. Sometimes it suffers a considerable change in travelling
through the atmosphere. For instance, when a square tower, seen at a
great distance, produces the impression of roundness, this is because
the sharp angles of its image have been rubbed off on the way to our
eyes. Sometimes the image continues to wander about after its original
has ceased to exist, and that is why the dead seem to revisit us in
our dreams. And sometimes the images of different objects coalesce as
they are floating about, thus producing the appearance of impossible
monsters, such as centaurs and chimaeras.[185]
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