General Sergison-Brooke and General de Crespigny felt their way forward, and Villers Pol was occupied during the night, but it was impossible to notify the artillery of the exact position of the leading companies by the time the attacks started on the 4th, and in order to allow a margin of safety the barrage had to start some way east of the village, with the result that some of our troops never caught it. Up to mid-day the Germans fought very stubbornly, but they were everywhere driven back, and by the evening Preux-au-Sart was in our hands, an advance of nearly four miles. So fierce had been the fighting that the losses on both sides were exceptionally heavy, the Germans in particular leaving a large number of dead upon the ground. During the two following days Heywood's Brigade drove back the enemy's rear-guards another five miles, and patrols of the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards entered Bavai, an important town, and the junction of no less than eleven roads. Bavai was not on the front allotted to the Guards Division, but during the whole of this advance the line on the left of the Division was very much thrown back, which caused great inconvenience, since it enabled the enemy to enfilade the troops from the north, for the Germans were now prodigal in the expenditure of shells, which they knew they could never carry away with them. The troops billeted in villages in rear suffered considerably, and as the left flank of the Division was thrown back the back areas were all within easy range from the north. In particular the village of Amfroipret was heavily punished, and General Heywood was severely wounded by a shell, which exploded in his headquarters just west of that village. Once more the 3rd Guards Brigade was without a commander. Brigadier-General Campbell, V.C., was sent for to take command, and in the meantime the Brigade was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling, Scots Guards. On the 7th Sergison-Brooke's Brigade, passing through the 3rd Guards Brigade, continued to drive the enemy back, but the following day the advance was checked owing to enfilade fire from the north. That afternoon a German orderly carrying an important message was captured. The message was at once sent by special despatch rider to Divisional Headquarters, and on being translated proved to be an urgent order to the rear-guard commander, telling him to hold on to his present position at all costs, and cover the withdrawal of the main body to a line east of Maubeuge. The resistance of the rear-guard, the message added, must be such as to gain time for the consolidation of this new line and thus save the rest of the army. General Matheson at once ordered General Sergison-Brooke to push forward his reserve Battalion (the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers) directly it was dark, with instructions to force its way through the enemy's rear-guard and straight on down the road to Maubeuge.