Lieut.-Colonel the Viscount Lascelles, D.S.O Commanding Officer. Capt. E. G. A. Fitzgerald, D.S.O. Adjutant. 2nd Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter Intelligence Officer. Capt. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C. No. 1 Company. Lieut. C. C. Carstairs, M.C. " " Lieut. F. S. V. Donnison " " Capt. A. H. S. Adair, M.C. No. 2 Company. Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn, M.C. " " Lieut. C. B. Hollins " " 2nd Lieut. J. Chapman " " Lieut. E. N. de Geijer, M.C. No. 3 Company. 2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon, M.C. " " 2nd Lieut. A. D. Cooper, D.S.O. " " Lieut. E. J. Bunbury, M.C. No. 4 Company. 2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon " " 2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther, M.C. " " 2nd Lieut. H. I'B. Smith " " Lieut. Graff, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer. [Sidenote: Sept. 27.] The attack of the Battalion was at right angles to the main attack, which was somewhat confusing; but, as the Battalion was holding a salient, it was necessary to have the right half Battalion facing east, one company facing north, and one company (in échelon) facing east. There was still a pocket of Germans on the left between the Battalion and the Canal, but the ground was heavily wired and quite impassable. It was therefore necessary to attack northward, and as there were many lines of trenches and much wire, the attack had to be organised in small parties, working over the top of the ground but parallel with the trenches, so that the wire might be crossed by entering the trenches. Each party was in charge of an officer or a specially selected non-commissioned officer, and although there was undoubtedly a risk of losing many first-rate men, this decision was justified by the fact that, in spite of the maze of trenches, none of the parties failed to reach their objectives.