The Greville Memoirs, Part 2 (of 3), Volume 1 (of 3): A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852Greville, Charles
History
The Greville Memoirs, Part 2 (of 3), Volume 1 (of 3): A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852
Greville, Charles
Great Britain -- History -- Victoria, 1837-1901
Thiers' letter expressed considerable alarm. After describing the
failure of Walewski and the other French agents, and enlarging
upon the efforts they had made, and were still making, to
restrain the Pasha, and prevent his making any offensive
movement, he said that this was the Pasha's ultimatum. He
offered, if France would join him and make common cause with him,
to place his fleets and armies at her disposal, and to be
governed in all things by her advice and wishes, a thing utterly
impossible for France to listen to. Upon the impossibility of
this alliance being represented to him, the prudence of keeping
quiet strenuously urged upon him, and the utmost endeavours made
to convince him that a defensive policy was the only wise and
safe course for him, he had engaged not to move forward, or take
any offensive course unless compelled to do so, by violence
offered to him; his army was concentrated at the foot of the
Taurus, and there (but in a menacing attitude) he would consent
to its remaining; but if any European troops were to advance
against him, or be transported to Syria, any attempt made to
foment another insurrection in Syria, or any attack made upon his
fleet, or any violence offered to his commerce, then he would
cross the Taurus, and, taking all consequences, commence
offensive operations. In that case, said Guizot, Constantinople
might be occupied by the Russians, and the British fleet enter
the Sea of Marmora; and if that happened, he could not answer for
the result in France, and he owned that he (and Thiers expressed
the same in his letter) was in the greatest alarm at all these
dangers and complications. He had seen Palmerston this morning,
and read Thiers' letter to him. I asked him if it had made any
impression on Palmerston. He said, 'Not the slightest;' that he
had said, 'Oh! Mehemet Ali cedera; il ne faut pas s'attendre
qu'il cede a la premiere sommation; mais donnez-lui quinze jours,
et il finira par ceder.' Guizot said that the failure of so many
of his predictions and expectations had not in the slightest
degree diminished Palmerston's confidence, and that there was in
fact no use whatever in speaking to him on the subject. Guizot is
evidently in great alarm, and well he may be, for there can be no
doubt that his Government are in a position of the greatest
embarrassment, far from inclined to war, the King especially
abhorring the very thoughts of it, and at the same time so far
committed that if the four allies act with any vigour and drive
Mehemet Ali to desperation, France must either kindle the flames
of war, or, after all her loud and threatening tone, succumb in a
manner not only intolerably galling to the national pride, but
which really would be very discreditable in itself.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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