This morning I received a note from Guizot, begging I would call on him as soon as I could. I went almost directly, when he produced a letter from Thiers, in which he desired Guizot to go immediately to Palmerston, and in the most formal and solemn manner to deny, in his name and in the name of France, that the mission of Walewski[16] had had any such object as that which had been imputed to it; that he had not endeavoured to persuade the Pasha not to accede to the terms imposed upon him, and that if he was disposed to accept them, 'La France ne se montrerait pas plus ambitieuse pour lui qu'il ne l'etait pour lui-meme,' and would certainly not interfere to prevent the execution of the Treaty. Moreover, he was to say that Walewski had not gone to Constantinople as the agent of the Pasha, but only to convey to M. de Pontois the intelligence of the communication which the Pasha had made to the Sultan through Rifat Bey, Rifat Bey having been despatched on the 6th with a very submissive letter from Mehemet Ali to the Sultan, in which he asked him to grant certain terms, the substance of which has been already made known. Guizot then said that he had likewise received authority to declare that if the Sultan accepted the terms proposed by Mehemet Ali, or even some modification of them (such as France could approve of), with the consent and concurrence of his Allies, and if he invited France to be a party to the new arrangement, and to join in guaranteeing a due execution of its provisions, France would accept such invitation, and would join the other Allies in compelling Mehemet Ali to a strict observance of the arrangement, and would, if necessary, use measures of coercion and hostility against him if he failed in a due performance, or infringed the limits assigned to him. I told M. Guizot that nothing could be more satisfactory than these communications, and he said that he had already asked for an interview with Palmerston, in order to impart the same to him. He then wanted to know if he might speak to Lord John if he met him at Holland House or elsewhere; but I advised him not, and told him that Palmerston was suspicious and jealous, and would take umbrage at any of his colleagues holding communications upon affairs which were his peculiar concern. He acquiesced altogether, and it was agreed that I should call on him to-morrow morning and hear what had passed between Palmerston and him. I took the opportunity of telling him on that occasion that the great evil, and that which rendered all negotiation and arrangement so difficult, was the absence of all reciprocal confidence, that we had none in his Minister (Thiers), and that the national pride and vanity (of which we, like themselves, had a share) were wounded by the ostentatious preparations for war, and the menacing and blustering tone of the press. He acknowledged these evils and their bad effects, and only shrugged up his shoulders at what I said about Thiers, of whom he has no