The Cabinet met this afternoon. Lord John Russell was to have taken the lead and developed his conciliatory notions, but a new turn was given to affairs by a note which Guizot placed in Palmerston's hands just before the Cabinet, which he only received from Paris this morning.[7] He called on Palmerston and gave it him; but without any observations. Palmerston brought it to the Cabinet, where it was read, and, to the extreme surprise of everybody, it was to the last degree moderate, and evincing a disposition to be very easily satisfied. This note is ill written, ill put together, and very tame. What a difficult task a French Minister must have, to defend at once such a note and such an expense as had been incurred! Probably Guizot did not much admire the production. The consequence was that the discussion turned on this document, and Palmerston immediately showed a disposition to haggle and bargain, and make it a pretext for extorting from France the best terms she could be got to yield, and all this in the spirit of a pedlar rather than of a statesman. This was, however, overruled. A better and more liberal disposition pervaded the majority, and it was settled that Palmerston should see Guizot and speak to him in a conciliatory tone, and that a note, in a corresponding spirit, should be drawn up and sent to the French Government. This note is, however, to be first submitted for the approbation, and, if necessary, alteration of the Cabinet, so that care will be taken to make it what it ought to be. It would now appear that the French Government would be well enough satisfied if the original terms offered to Mehemet Ali were still held out to him, and if it is made clear that he will in no case be molested in the hereditary possession of Egypt; but Palmerston began talking of leaving him Egypt _for his life_, which was, however, instantly put down by the majority. A more decided disposition appeared in the majority of the Cabinet to adopt the conciliatory policy; whereas they exhibited at the previous meetings rather a doubtful manner, without, however, on any occasion saying much either way. Palmerston displayed the same overweening confidence, and the same desire to conceal whatever militated against his opinion. Besides talking of the success they had already obtained (which after all amounts to very little), he said he had seen somebody, who had seen somebody else, who knew that Louis Philippe was absolutely determined against war under any circumstances. It turned out that there was a despatch from Sir Charles Smith (between whom and Napier there is some jealousy or misunderstanding), in which he says that the position they occupy is of no use whatever, but is purely defensive, and if Ibrahim does not attack the Turks, and expose himself to a defeat, they can do nothing against him. This, however, Palmerston held cheap, because it did not square with his wishes. On the whole the