It is not very easy to ascertain what the feeling is in Russia about the war, but there is reason to believe that the nobles are getting very sick of it, and are very discontented with the Emperor, not so much for having engaged in it as for the manner in which it has been carried on. At St. Petersburg there prevails an intense hostility to us, and great wrath against Austria, and instead of yielding, or any thought of it, the notion is that they mean to redouble their efforts next year, and bring into the field far greater forces than they have yet done. I perceive that the question of the disposal of the Crimea (when we get it) is still undecided. Some fancy that we ought to hold it, as a great advantage to have the power of offering it back to Russia when the question of peace arises. I am more inclined to the other view, of destroying the place, and if possible the harbour, and, after carrying off or destroying all the ships, to abandon the peninsula and leave the Russians to reoccupy it if they please. This would be very consistent with the object with which the war was professedly undertaken, and the Crimea, without Sebastopol and without a fleet, would be no longer formidable to Turkey for many a year to come; but no doubt there would be difficulty in this as in any arrangement, and much difference of opinion, not unlikely to produce dissension, amongst our allies and ourselves. There is good reason to believe that our late naval attack on the forts was a blunder, and that it did no good whatever. If Lyons had been in command, he probably would have declined to make it, and he could have ventured to exercise his own discretion, which Dundas could not. Then it was very badly arranged, and this was the fault of the French Admiral, who at the last moment insisted on altering the plan of attack, and (contrary to the advice of all his officers) Dundas gave way to him. In this, however, it is not fair to blame the English Admiral, who may have acted wisely; for his position was delicate and difficult, and he had to consider the alliance of the countries and the harmonious action of the two fleets, as well as the particular operation. BALAKLAVA. _November 14th._--Yesterday morning we received telegraphic news of another battle, from which we may expect a long list of killed and wounded. The affair of the 25th, in which our light cavalry was cut to pieces, seems to have been the result of mismanagement in some quarter, and the blame must attach either to Lucan, Cardigan, Captain Nolan who was killed, or to Raglan himself. Perhaps nobody is really to blame, but, if any one be, my own impression is that it is Raglan. He _wrote_ the order, and it was his business to make it so clear that it could not be mistaken, and to give it conditionally, or with such discretionary powers as should prevent its being vigorously enforced under circumstances which he could not foresee, or of which he might have no cognisance.