Footnote 1: [It is remarkable that this conversation of the Emperor with Lord Clarendon at Compiègne took place within a month of the speech to Baron Hübner on New Year's Day, which was the signal of war between France and Austria, and at a time when the secret alliance between the Emperor and M. de Cavour had been already concluded. The Emperor's object was evidently to delude his English guests, and Lord Clarendon was partially deceived by him, although he clearly perceived that there was danger of war ahead.] _December 12th._--Another day the Emperor asked Clarendon to come into his room, when he told him that he wanted his advice, that he was in a great dilemma and embarrassment in regard to his Roman occupation, and in a false position, from which he did not know how to extricate himself. He was dying to recall the French troops and yet unable to do it. He had always hoped to be able to get the policy laid down in the Edgar Ney letter carried out, but as soon as the Pope and his ecclesiastical councillors returned to Rome they refused to do anything, and whenever he held out any threat of withdrawing his troops they always said he might do so whenever he pleased, for they knew very well the reasons which prevented his doing it: the moment the French troops marched out there would be an uprising in Rome and in the Papal States. The religious party in France would deeply resent his exposing the Pope to any such danger, and as soon as the French went away the Austrians would march in and be masters of the whole country. Clarendon acknowledged the gravity of the situation and the difficulty, but could suggest no solution of it. They discussed the possibility of inducing the Pope to relinquish his temporal sovereignty, and to accept a great revenue instead, but neither of them seems to have thought this plan feasible. [Sidenote: NAPOLEON'S SPEECH TO BARON HÜBNER.]